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CIVIL RIGHTS IN A DESEGREGATING AMERICA 
 
83 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) 
 
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos* 
 
The law largely has overlooked one of the most important sociological 
developments of the last half-century: a sharp decline in residential segregation. 
In 1970, 80% of African Americans would have had to switch neighborhoods for 
blacks to be spread evenly across the typical metropolitan area. By 2010, this 
proportion was down to 55%, and was continuing to fall. Bringing this striking 
trend (and its causes) to the attention of the legal literature is my initial aim in 
this Article. 
My more fundamental goal, though, is to explore what desegregation means 
for the three bodies of civil rights law—housing discrimination, vote dilution, 
and school segregation—to which it is tied most closely. I first explain how all 
three bodies historically relied on segregation. Its perpetuation by housing 
practices led to disparate impact liability under the Fair Housing Act. It meant 
that minority groups were “geographically compact,” as required by the Voting 
Rights Act. And it contributed to the racially separated schools from which 
segregative intent was inferred in Brown and its progeny. 
I then argue that all of these doctrines are disrupted by desegregation. Fair 
Housing Act plaintiffs cannot win certain disparate impact suits if residential 
patterns are stably integrated. Nor can claimants under the Voting Rights Act 
satisfy the statute’s geographic compactness requirement. And desegregating 
homes usually result in desegregating schools, which in turn make illicit intent 
difficult to infer. 
Lastly, I offer some tentative thoughts about civil rights law in a less racially 
separated America. I am most optimistic about the Fair Housing Act. “Integrated 
and balanced living patterns” are among the statute’s aspirations, and it 
increasingly is achieving them. Conversely, I am most pessimistic about the 
Voting Rights Act. One of its objectives is minority representation, which is 
threatened when minorities are politically distinctive but spatially dispersed. And 
a mixed verdict seems in order for school desegregation law. Rising residential 
integration eventually should produce rising school integration. But it has not 
done so yet, and even when it does, this improvement may not reach schools’ 
other racial imbalances. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Two generations ago, in the wake of rioting that scarred dozens of American 
cities, the Kerner Commission issued its landmark report on urban unrest.1 The 
report warned darkly of high and rising racial segregation. “To continue present 
policies,” it intoned, “is to make permanent the division of our country into two 
societies: one, largely Negro and poor, located in the central cities; the other, 
predominantly white and affluent, located in the suburbs.”2 One generation ago, a 
pair of prominent sociologists, Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, penned 
another highly influential work on racial separation.3 American Apartheid traced 
the ways in which public policy produced what the authors termed 
                                                 
1 See REPORT OF THE NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968) [hereinafter KERNER 
COMM’N REPORT]; see also John Charles Boger, Race and the American City: The Kerner Commission in 
Retrospect—an Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289 (1993) (commenting at length on report’s significance).  
2 KERNER COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 19; see also id. at 1 (“This is our basic conclusion: Our 
nation is moving toward two societies, one black,  one white—separate and unequal.”). 
3 See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE 
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); see also PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS 
AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY (2013) (calling American Apartheid one of two “major 
work[s] on urban poverty” published in last several decades). 
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“hypersegregation,”4 and argued that it was “the key structural factor[] 
responsible for the perpetuation of black poverty.”5 
In the legal academy, the conventional wisdom is that little has changed since 
the Kerner Report and American Apartheid. The drafter of the preeminent treatise 
on housing discrimination law asserts that “the United States continues to be 
characterized by high levels of racial segregation.”6 Another housing expert 
comments that “the failure to stem racial residential segregation has helped it to 
deepen, widen, and become seemingly intractable.”7 A recent amicus brief signed 
by dozens of housing scholars declares that “[r]esidential racial segregation 
across the United States remains pervasive.”8 Summing up the literature, Michael 
Maly observes, “The volume of research on the extent of segregation . . . makes 
it difficult to believe that integrated neighborhoods even exist.”9 
But the conventional wisdom is wrong. In fact, a great deal has changed over 
the last two generations—so much that sociologists are now churning out works 
with titles like The Waning of American Apartheid10 and The End of the 
Segregated Century.11 Take the most common measure of segregation, which 
represents the share of group members who would have to switch neighborhoods 
for the group to be spread evenly across a metropolitan area. This metric peaked 
at about 80% for African Americans in 1970. But it has since sunk to roughly 
55%, the same value, more or less, as in 1910.12 Or consider another popular 
index of segregation, which captures the makeup of the community of the typical 
group member. In 1970, the average black lived in a neighborhood that was 
about 60% more black than her metropolitan area as a whole. But this figure has 
since dropped to roughly 30%, or approximately the same level as in 1920.13 
Almost all of the rise in segregation that took place during the twentieth century 
thus has been reversed. 
                                                 
4 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 17-216; see also Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, 
Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation Along Five Dimensions, 26 
DEMOGRAPHY 373 (1989). 
5 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 9. 
6 ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 2:1 (2013). 
7 Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The Fair Housing Choice Myth, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 967, 970 (2012). 
8 Brief of Amici Curiae Housing Scholars, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Cmties. 
Project, Inc., No. 13-1371, at 4 (U.S. Dec. 23, 2014). For other examples of legal scholars characterizing 
segregation as high and stable, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1965, 1979 (2000) (commenting on “prevalence of segregation as a social phenomenon”); 
Rigel C. Oliveri, Beyond Disparate Impact: How the Fair Housing Movement Can Move On, 54 WASHBURN 
L.J. 625, 642 (2015) (noting “persistent and pervasive nature of residential racial segregation across the 
nation”); and Daria Roithmayr, Locked In Segregation, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 197, 198 (2004) (pointing out 
“persistence of residential segregation” and labeling it a “stable feature of the American socio-economic 
landscape”).  
9 MICHAEL T. MALY, BEYOND SEGREGATION: MULTIRACIAL AND MULTIETHNIC NEIGHBORHOODS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2 (2005). 
10 Reynolds Farley, The Waning of American Apartheid?, 10 CONTEXTS 36 (2011). 
11 Edward Glaeser & Jacob Vigdor, The End of the Segregated Century: Racial Separation in America’s 
Neighborhoods, 1890-2010 (Manhattan Inst. Civic Report No. 66, Jan. 2012). For other optimistically titled 
works, see WILLIAM H. FREY, DIVERSITY EXPLOSION: HOW NEW RACIAL DEMOGRAPHICS ARE REMAKING 
AMERICA (2015); MALY, supra note 9; and John Iceland et al., Sun Belt Rising: Regional Population Change 
and the Decline in Black Residential Segregation, 1970-2009, 50 DEMOGRAPHY 97 (2013). 
12 See Glaeser & Vigdor, supra note 11, at 4. 
13 See id. 
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What accounts for this impressive (and underappreciated) trend? One factor 
is the decline in housing discrimination by both public and private parties. 
Overtly segregative governmental policies are now rare,14 and according to a 
series of studies by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 
discriminatory acts by real estate professionals have fallen in frequency as well.15 
Another explanation is the increased willingness of whites to live in integrated 
areas. In 1976, for instance, only 50% of Detroit-area whites said they would 
consider moving to a community that was one-fifth black.16 By 2004, this 
proportion had surged to 79%.17 And still another cause is the spectacular 
population growth of non-black minorities, in particular Hispanics and Asian 
Americans. These groups now seem to serve as “buffers” that enable whites and 
blacks to live together in durably diverse neighborhoods.18 
My initial aim in this Article, then, is to bring to the legal literature’s 
attention the recent sociological findings about the shifts in, and sources of, 
segregation. It is time for the stylized facts that have long guided thinking about 
these topics to be updated. My more fundamental goal, though, is to explore what 
the decline in segregation means for the law itself. At least three bodies of civil 
rights doctrine—involving housing discrimination, vote dilution, and school 
segregation—are closely connected to racial groups’ residential patterns. For 
each of these areas, I show how the existence of segregation historically has 
supported the imposition of liability and aggressive remedies. I then argue that 
desegregation is reshaping the legal landscape and making key doctrinal elements 
harder to establish. Lastly, I offer some tentative thoughts about the role of civil 
rights law in a less racially separated America. 
Start with housing discrimination, which is banned at the federal level by the 
Fair Housing Act (FHA).19 The FHA is tied to segregation in several ways. First, 
the Supreme Court has held repeatedly that plaintiffs have statutory standing if 
they live in areas that are segregated or in danger of becoming segregated.20 The 
deprivation of the “social and professional benefits of living in an integrated 
society” is a cognizable injury.21 Second, segregated residential patterns are 
useful evidence in FHA cases brought pursuant to a disparate treatment theory. 
They help to demonstrate the discriminatory intent of, say, housing authorities 
that limit low-income projects to minority-heavy areas. And third, as the Court 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Segregation in Post-Civil Rights America: Stalled 
Integration or the End of the Segregated Century?, 11 DU BOIS REV. 205, 206 (2014) (“Public policies . . . 
appear largely to have ended overt racial discrimination in real estate and lending markets.”). 
15 See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
MINORITIES, at xxiii (2013) (“Long-term trends in patterns of discrimination suggest that the attitudes and 
actions of rental and sales agents have changed over time . . . .”). 
16 See Farley, supra note 10, at 40. 
17 See id. 
18 See, e.g., John R. Logan & Charles Zhang, Global Neighborhoods: New Pathways to Diversity and 
Separation, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1069, 1070 (2010) (concluding that “stable diversity is possible . . . if black entry is 
preceded by a substantial presence of both Hispanic and Asian residents”). 
19 The FHA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19. 
20 See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 376, 381 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of 
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-11 (1979); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972). 
21 Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 111 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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recently confirmed,22 one type of disparate impact claim available under the FHA 
is that certain practices “have the effect of perpetuating housing segregation in a 
community.”23 Both actual segregation levels and the levels that would have 
arisen but for the challenged practices are crucial to such a claim. 
All of these aspects of FHA doctrine are destabilized by desegregation. For 
example, plaintiffs do not have standing (at least on this basis) if they live in 
areas that are integrated and likely to remain so. They do not suffer the harm of 
segregated living recognized by the FHA. Similarly, it is more difficult to 
establish discriminatory intent in the absence of segregated residential patterns. 
Without them, plaintiffs cannot benefit from the presumption that parties intend 
the foreseeable consequences of their actions.24 And segregative impact may not 
even be a viable theory of liability in a stably integrated region. It founders on 
both the lack of existing segregation and the improbability of demographic 
change. 
Next take racial vote dilution, which is prohibited federally by the Voting 
Rights Act (VRA),25 and which refers to policies that diminish minorities’ 
electoral influence without disenfranchising them outright. In a key decision 
construing the VRA’s core provision, the Court held that minority populations 
must be “geographically compact” in order to state a claim,26 and that there must 
be racial polarization in voting.27 Geographic compactness is almost a synonym 
for geographic segregation. The criterion is satisfied only by minority groups that 
are densely concentrated in discrete areas. Racial polarization is related to 
segregation as well, only methodologically rather than substantively. It is easier 
to estimate the share of each racial group that supports a given candidate if there 
exist precincts occupied almost exclusively by each group’s members. These 
“homogeneous precincts” make the analysis more tractable.28 
Again, desegregation unsettles the doctrine. If minority populations are 
residentially integrated, then they cannot comply with the compactness 
requirement imposed by the Court, meaning that there cannot be liability under 
the VRA. If a jurisdiction nevertheless encloses a dispersed minority group 
within a single district, then the district probably violates the constitutional ban 
                                                 
22 See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmties. Project, __ S. Ct. ___, 2015 WL 
2473449, at *13 (June 25, 2015) [hereinafter Inclusive Communities] (stating that FHA bans practices “creating 
discriminatory effects or perpetuating segregation” (emphasis added)). 
23 SCHWEMM, supra note 6, at § 10-7. 
24 See, e.g., Personnel Adm’r. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278 (1979) (reciting this common law 
presumption). Of course, this presumption alone is insufficient to establish discriminatory intent, at least under 
the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 278-80.  
25 See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (banning practices that result in minority members having “less opportunity . . 
. to elect representatives of their choice”). 
26 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986). 
27 See id. at 51. Gingles’s second prong requires minority political cohesion and its third prong requires 
white bloc voting. See id. In combination, they amount to a racial polarization criterion. 
28 See id. at 52, 53 n.20 (referring to “extreme case analysis” carried out by plaintiffs’ expert as “standard 
in the literature”); see also D. James Greiner, Ecological Inference in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where We 
Are Now, and Where Do We Want to Be?, 47 JURIMETRICS 115, 155-57 (2007) (listing dozens of VRA cases 
employing homogeneous precinct analysis). 
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on racial gerrymandering.29 Race is the only justification for this kind of 
constituency, but it is not a permissible one. And even if a compact enough 
majority-minority district can be drawn in a desegregated area, plaintiffs are 
unlikely to be able to show that voting is racially polarized. Homogeneous 
precinct analysis breaks down when most precincts are racially heterogeneous, 
and even regressions become unreliable when two (or more) racial groups coexist 
throughout a region.30 
Last consider school segregation, which the Court forbade in perhaps the 
most celebrated decision in its history.31 School enrollments are linked to 
residential patterns because of the American norm of neighborhood schools. 
Children tend to attend schools located near their homes, thus reproducing at the 
school level the racial makeup of local housing. However, the correlation 
between residential and school segregation is imperfect. The latter also is 
influenced by parents’ decisions to enroll their students in private schools, as 
well as by an array of school district policies. Some of these policies are 
integrative (and often adopted due to court order): busing, magnet schools, 
attendance zone adjustment, and the like. Other policies, such as vouchers and 
charter schools, usually are enacted for non-racial reasons. 
Because school segregation is a function of residential segregation and other 
factors, its trajectory since Brown has not been a steady descent. Instead, it 
plummeted in the late 1960s and 1970s, at a much faster rate than residential 
segregation, as courts ordered far-reaching integrative policies in hundreds of 
school districts.32 But since the late 1980s, it has remained roughly constant.33 
The continuing decline in residential segregation has exerted a downward 
pressure on school segregation, but this effect has been offset by the release of 
many school districts from judicial supervision.34 At present, thanks to the 
removal of most court-mandated remedies, the connection between residential 
                                                 
29 This ban originated in the landmark case of Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), which recognized the 
“analytically distinct claim,” id. at 652, that a district was drawn predominantly for racial reasons.  
30 See generally D. James Greiner, Re-Solidifying Racial Bloc Voting: Empirics and Legal Doctrine in the 
Melting Pot, 86 IND. L.J. 447 (2011) (discussing difficulties caused by desegregation for racial polarization 
analysis). 
31 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). More specifically, the Court forbade de jure but not 
de facto school segregation. I refer to school segregation as de jure or intentional when I wish to call attention to 
its constitutionality. When I refer to school segregation without any qualifiers, I mean de facto segregation: 
schools’ actual level of racial separation. Consistent with this usage, I treat integration and desegregation as 
synonymous, both referring to de facto rather than de jure conditions. 
32 See, e.g., John D. Logan & Deirdre Oakley, The Continuing Legacy of the Brown Decision: Court 
Action and School Segregation, 1960-2000, at 15 (Jan. 28, 2004) (showing decline in dissimilarity index of 
average school district from 79.4 in 1968 to 45.4 in 1990). 
33 See, e.g., Sean F. Reardon & Ann Owens, 60 Years After Brown: Trends and Consequences of School 
Segregation 8 (Oct. 1, 2013) (“[T]he last 25 years have been characterized by largely stable patterns of sorting 
of students among schools . . . .”). 
34 See, e.g., Charles T. Clotfelter et al., Federal Oversight, Local Control, and the Specter of 
“Resegregation” in Southern Schools, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 347, 350 (2006) (noting that “were it not for 
judicial rulings of unitary status, racial segregation across schools might have declined” due to “decline in 
residential segregation”). 
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and school segregation is the strongest it has been in decades.35 Going forward, 
this means that trends in the two metrics should be similar. 
Doctrinally, then, residential segregation plays a role in school desegregation 
litigation to the extent—which is substantial—that it determines school 
enrollments. At the liability stage, racially uneven enrollments caused by racially 
uneven residential patterns support an inference of segregative intent on the part 
of the school district. Uneven residential patterns also make it more likely that 
policies like attendance zone demarcation and new school construction will have 
a segregative impact, from which an illicit motive can be inferred as well. After 
liability has been imposed, courts presume that enrollment imbalances are 
“vestiges” of the original constitutional violation that make it improper for 
judicial supervision to be lifted.36 Since these imbalances often are the result of 
residential segregation, it often prevents school districts from attaining unitary 
status. 
Once again, desegregation complicates the picture. At the liability stage, it is 
more difficult for plaintiffs to establish segregative intent if school enrollments, 
like the residential patterns that help drive them, are integrating. There still may 
be an improper motive in this scenario, but it is harder to discern if it does not 
manifest itself in racially skewed student bodies. Likewise, when a district 
requests to be released from court oversight, its claim is more likely to succeed if 
its schools are desegregating thanks to the ongoing residential trend. School 
enrollment statistics are vital evidence in any unitary status proceeding, and the 
better they look, the better the district’s odds of terminating the litigation. 
So what might we conclude about the state of civil rights law in an America 
in which racial and spatial divisions are (gradually) mending? I would deliver a 
mixed verdict. On the one hand, some of the evils the law has long fought are 
fading, which is cause for celebration. One of the FHA’s aspirations, in 
particular, is the creation of “‘truly integrated and balanced living patterns,’” as 
its chief Senate sponsor put it.37 We certainly are not there yet, but this goal’s 
achievement is no longer wholly fanciful. Similarly, even though it is invidious 
intent that Brown and its progeny proscribe, the cases still envision a future 
“without a ‘white’ school and a ‘Negro’ school, but just schools.”38 Progress 
toward school integration has stalled since the late 1980s, but it is likely to 
resume now that residential patterns and school enrollments are so tightly 
coupled. 
On the other hand, segregation is not the only ill that civil rights law tries to 
cure, and its improvement does not mean that other problems have been solved. 
                                                 
35 See, e,g., Erica Frankenberg, The Role of Residential Segregation in Contemporary School Segregation, 
45 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 548, 557-58 (2013) (showing increase in correlation between residential and school 
segregation to 0.91 in 2010). 
36 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15, 18 (1971); see also, e.g., Freeman v. 
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 505 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that once a violation has been proven, “there 
arises a presumption, effectively irrebuttable . . . that any current racial imbalance is the product of that 
violation”). 
37 Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting statement by Sen. Walter 
Mondale). 
38 Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968). 
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For instance, both the FHA and the cases from Brown onward are deeply 
concerned about discrimination too—the adverse treatment of real estate 
customers and schoolchildren because of their race, irrespective of the 
segregative consequences. True, discrimination is one of the most potent drivers 
of segregation. But discrimination also can occur in a more integrated society, 
and the law needs to remain wary of it even as segregation continues to decline. 
Even more worryingly, the VRA seeks to secure representation for 
minorities, but this aim is directly threatened by desegregation. To win districts 
in which they can elect their preferred candidates, minorities need to prove 
geographic compactness and voting polarization—both daunting tasks if they are 
residentially integrated. Fortunately, these hurdles are the product of the Court’s 
case law rather than the statute itself, and so could be lifted without legislative 
intervention. The Court could drop the compactness requirement that it conjured 
out of thin air. It could allow non-electoral evidence, survey results in particular, 
to be used to establish polarization. And most promisingly, it could embrace 
remedies other than single-member districts, thus enabling even dispersed 
minorities to be represented. 
The Article unfolds as follows. First, in Part I, I discuss the sociological 
literature on racial segregation. I cover definitions of segregation, its trends for 
various racial groups, and the factors that cause it. Then, in Parts II-IV, I analyze 
the implications of declining segregation for the three bodies of civil rights law to 
which it is most relevant: the Fair Housing Act, the Voting Rights Act, and 
school desegregation doctrine. For each area, I show how it historically has relied 
on the existence of segregation, how it is challenged by greater residential 
integration, and how it might be rethought in a less racially separated 
environment. 
One last point before beginning: While the lessening of black-white 
segregation is striking, not all the news here is good. For one thing, black-white 
segregation has not fallen at the same rate throughout the country. In numerous 
metropolitan areas, especially in the Midwest and Northeast, it remains 
stubbornly high.39 In addition, segregation scores for other minorities, namely 
Hispanics and Asian Americans, have not declined in recent years. Instead, they 
mostly have held steady, albeit at lower levels and despite these groups’ rising 
populations.40 And even as racial segregation wanes, income segregation is 
worsening. Mixed-income neighborhoods are becoming rarer, and the poor and 
the rich are increasingly isolated from each other.41 None of these developments 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., John R. Logan & Brian J. Stults, The Persistence of Segregation in the Metropolis: New 
Findings from the 2010 Census 9 (Census Brief, 2011) (labeling “persistence of very high black-white 
segregation in a few major Northeastern and Midwestern metropolitan areas” a “striking feature”). 
40 See, e.g., John Iceland & Gregory Sharp, White Residential Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: 
Conceptual Issues, Patterns, and Trends from the U.S. Census, 1980 to 2010, 32 POPUL. RES. POL’Y REV. 663, 
665 (2013) (“Hispanic and Asian segregation has not declined markedly over the past three decades.”). 
41 See, e.g., Sean F. Reardon & Kendra Bischoff, Income Inequality and Income Segregation, 116 AM. J. 
SOC. 1092, 1116 (2011) (“Average metropolitan area income segregation . . . [grew] from 1970 to 2000, with 
the fastest increase occurring in the 1980s.”). 
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refutes the optimistic premise of this project. But it is important to remember the 
clouds and not just the silver lining. 
 
I. RACIAL SEGREGATION IN AMERICA 
 
This is an odd sort of law review article, premised as it is on a sociological 
phenomenon, racial desegregation, of which the legal literature is mostly 
unaware. Because of this oddity, I think it is necessary to document the 
phenomenon thoroughly before turning to what it means for civil rights law. This 
documentation is the purpose of this Part. I hope it will convince readers that a 
trend that may seem counterintuitive actually is occurring.  
I begin by surveying the various measures of segregation, as well as the 
various groups and geographic units to which they may be applied. For the most 
part, I use the index of dissimilarity, with respect to blacks and whites, for 
Census tracts nested within metropolitan areas. Next, I summarize the changes in 
segregation over time. Black-white segregation has declined sharply since 1970, 
while levels for Hispanics and Asian Americans have stayed constant (but lower) 
over this period. I then examine some of the reasons why black-white segregation 
is falling. Housing discrimination is rarer now, whites are more open to living in 
diverse neighborhoods, and blacks are migrating to metropolitan areas more 
conducive to integration. Lastly, I identify some notable caveats. Black-white 
segregation is still very high in certain areas, it remains sensitive to financial 
shocks, and socioeconomic separation is rising. 
 
A. Definitions 
 
Sociologists have argued for decades over how best to measure segregation. 
In a well-known 1955 article, Otis and Beverly Duncan observed that “[t]here 
have been proposed . . . several alternative indexes of the degree of residential 
segregation,” all derivable from what they called the “segregation curve.”42 
Likewise, in an influential 1988 paper, Massey and Denton identified “20 
potential measures of residential segregation.”43 They also claimed that each of 
these metrics corresponded to one of five distinct dimensions of segregation: 
evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering.44 
Fortunately, segregation analysis does not, in fact, require dozens of indices 
or a fistful of dimensions. It is now reasonably clear that three of Massey and 
Denton’s dimensions (concentration, centralization, and clustering) collapse into 
                                                 
42 Otis Dudley Duncan & Beverly Duncan, A Methodological Analysis of Segregation Indexes, 20 AM. 
SOC. REV. 210, 210 (1955). The Duncans also concluded that “there is little information in any of the indexes 
beyond that contained in the index [of dissimilarity] and the city nonwhite proportion.” Id. at 214.  
43 Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, The Dimensions of Residential Segregation, 67 SOC. FORCES 
281, 282 (1988). 
44 See id. at 283; see also, e.g., Sean F. Reardon & Glenn Firebaugh, Measures of Multigroup Segregation, 
32 SOC. METHODOLOGY 33, 36-55 (2002) (defining and assessing six measures of multigroup segregation); 
Michael J. White, Segregation and Diversity: Measures in Population Distribution, 52 POPUL. INDEX 198, 199-
214 (1986) (same with respect to ten measures of biracial segregation). 
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evenness.45 A group that is packed into small areas, or located in the city center, 
or clustered in a contiguous enclave, necessarily has an uneven spatial 
distribution. 
There also is a good deal of consensus as to how to measure the two 
remaining dimensions: evenness and exposure. The index of dissimilarity is the 
most common evenness metric.46 It represents the share of a group’s members 
who would have to move from one geographic subunit to another in order for the 
group to be spread uniformly across a broader geographic region.47 A score of 
100% indicates complete segregation, in that every group member would have to 
move, while a score of 0% means a group is perfectly integrated. And the index 
of isolation is the most popular measure of exposure.48 It denotes, for the typical 
group member, the share of people in her subunit who belong to the same 
group.49 It too varies from 0% (no same-group neighbors) to 100% (all same-
group neighbors). 
Most sociologists further agree that, of the dissimilarity and isolation indices, 
the former better captures the colloquial meaning of segregation. If, in Massey 
and Denton’s words, “residential segregation is the degree to which two or more 
groups live separate from one another,” the concept is closer to the evenness of 
groups’ distributions than to their exposure to one another.50 The other advantage 
of the dissimilarity index is that it is insensitive to groups’ population shares. 
Given a particular residential pattern, it does not rise or fall as groups’ numbers 
change.51 In contrast, the isolation index is tied closely to group size. “Other 
factors being equal, larger ethnic groups will be more isolated than smaller ones 
simply because there are more coethnics present with which to share 
neighborhoods.”52 I therefore focus on the dissimilarity index here, though I also 
refer occasionally to the isolation index. 
                                                 
45 See Sean F. Reardon & David O’Sullivan, Measures of Spatial Segregation, 34 SOC. METHODOLOGY 
121, 125 (2004) (observing that “if we derived a segregation measure from information about the exact locations 
and spatial environments of individuals . . . there would be no conceptual distinction at all between evenness 
and clustering”); id. at 127 (also noting that “centralization and concentration dimensions can be seen as 
specific subcategories of spatial unevenness”). 
46 See, e.g., Claude S. Fischer et al., Distinguishing the Geographic Levels and Social Dimensions of U.S. 
Metropolitan Segregation, 1960-2000, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 37, 41 (2004) (calling dissimilarity index “the most 
common” measure of segregation); Salvatore Saporito & Deenesh Sohoni, Coloring Outside the Lines: Racial 
Segregation in Public Schools and Their Attendance Boundaries, 79 SOC. OF EDUC. 81, 93 (2006) (dissimilarity 
index “is considered the ‘workhorse’ of segregation measures”). 
47 See, e.g., Massey & Denton, supra note 43, at 284 (defining dissimilarity index mathematically). 
48 See, e.g., Iceland & Sharp, supra note 40, at 670 (calling isolation index “the most widely used measure 
of exposure”); Andrew L. Spivak, The Influence of Race, Class, and Metropolitan Area Characteristics on 
African-American Residential Segregation, 94 SOC. SCI. Q. 1414, 1419 (2013) (isolation index is one of “two 
types of exposure indices commonly used to measure residential segregation”). 
49 See, e.g., Massey & Denton, supra note 43, at 288 (defining isolation index mathematically). 
50 Id. at 282; see also, e.g., Jeffrey M. Timberlake & John Iceland, Changes in Racial and Ethnic 
Residential Inequality in American Cities, 1970-2000, 6 CITY & CMTY. 335, 340 (2007) (noting historical 
consensus that “the index of dissimilarity (D) was the best measure of residential segregation when 
conceptualized as evenness of population distribution”). 
51 See, e.g., JOHN ICELAND, WHERE WE LIVE NOW: IMMIGRATION AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 41 
(2009) (“The dissimilarity index has the advantage of not being sensitive to the relative size of the groups in 
question.”). 
52 Iceland et al., supra note 11, at 103. 
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Importantly, both of these indices can be calculated only for two groups at a 
time.53 African Americans are usually one of the two in the work I discuss, both 
because they have experienced the most severe discrimination of any American 
racial minority and because more information is available about their residential 
patterns.54 But I also provide data, where it exists, about Hispanic and Asian 
American segregation. The second group in most analyses is the non-Hispanic 
white population. Some studies, though, use all people who do not belong to the 
racial minority at issue. It is worth noting as well that scholars have begun to 
develop multigroup variants to the dissimilarity index, such as the entropy 
index.55 These alternatives are better in theory because they do not treat 
segregation as a biracial phenomenon,56 and I cite them where possible. 
Regrettably, they have not been calculated for nearly as many areas or years.  
The last methodological choice for indices of segregation is to which spatial 
units to apply them.57 Both a subunit (such as a Census block, block group, or 
tract) and a broader region (such as a city, metropolitan area, or state) must be 
selected. Most studies use Census tracts as subunits, because they roughly 
coincide with neighborhoods and are designed to be “as homogeneous as 
possible with respect to population characteristics, economic status, and living 
conditions.”58 And metropolitan areas are used most often as broader regions, 
because they have “a high degree of social and economic integration” and 
constitute the relevant housing and labor markets for most people.59 Accordingly, 
the segregation statistics I present below typically are for tracts located in 
metropolitan areas.60 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., Reardon & Firebaugh, supra note 44, at 34 (“[T]he major methodological developments in 
segregation measurement have been limited to measuring segregation between two population groups . . . .”). 
54 In particular, blacks are the only minority group for which historical segregation statistics back to the 
nineteenth century are available. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 21; Glaeser & Vigdor, supra 
note 11, at 4. 
55 See, e.g., John Iceland, The Multigroup Entropy Index (Also Known as Theil’s H or the Information 
Theory Index) 7 (Dec. 2004) (defining entropy index mathematically); Reardon & Firebaugh, supra note 44, at 
37 (same). Scholars also have devised explicitly spatial measures that take into account where exactly people 
are located. See, e.g., Reardon & O’Sullivan, supra note 45, at 136-44; Barrett A. Lee et al., Beyond the Census 
Tract: Patterns and Determinants of Racial Segregation at Multiple Geographic Scales, 73 AM. SOC. REV. 766, 
770-73 (2008). These metrics are used even more infrequently than the multigroup ones. 
56 See, e.g., Mary J. Fischer, The Relative Importance of Income and Race in Determining Residential 
Outcomes in U.S. Urban Areas, 1970-2000, 38 URB. AFFAIRS REV. 669, 676 (2003) (“One advantage of 
entropy-based measures is this ability to examine segregation between more than two groups simultaneously.”). 
Also usefully, the entropy index is additive and so can be subdivided between different geographic levels. See 
id. at 675. 
57 See, e.g., Chad R. Farrell, Bifurcation, Fragmentation, or Integration? The Racial and Geographic 
Structure of Metropolitan Segregation, 1990–2000, 45 URB. STUD. 467, 468 (2008) (“The measurement of 
segregation usually entails an effort to quantify the unequal distribution of social groups across smaller 
geographical units . . . within a larger region . . . .”). 
58 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHIC AREAS REFERENCE MANUAL 10-1 (1994), available at 
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/garm.html [hereinafter CENSUS MANUAL]; see also, e.g., Iceland & Sharp, 
supra note 40, at 669 (“Census tracts are also by far the unit most used in research on residential segregation.”). 
59 CENSUS MANUAL, supra note 58, at 13-1; see also, e.g., J. ERIC OLIVER, THE PARADOXES OF 
INTEGRATION 23 (2010); Iceland et al., supra note 11, at 101 (“Residential segregation usually refers to the 
distribution of groups . . . within metropolitan areas.”). 
60 In general, the smaller the subunit considered, the higher the resulting segregation score. More variation 
is expressed between rather than within smaller subunits. See David W.S. Wong, Spatial Dependency of 
Segregation Indices, 41 CANADIAN GEOGRAPHER 128, 130-31 (1997). However, areas’ segregation rankings 
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This background should suffice for present purposes. Next, I summarize 
trends in segregation for blacks, Hispanics, and Asian Americans for all periods 
for which data is available. For the above reasons, I devote the most attention to 
the index of dissimilarity, calculated for blacks and whites and for tracts in 
metropolitan areas. 
 
B. Trends 
 
Start with the racial separation undergone by blacks. As described in 
harrowing detail in American Apartheid—and as shown in Figure 1 below, which 
is borrowed from a recent study by Edward Glaeser and Jacob Vigdor—it grew 
steadily from 1890 to 1970.61 The black-nonblack dissimilarity score of the 
average metropolitan area, weighted by each area’s black population, increased 
from about 45% to about 80% during this era.62 Similarly, the average black-
nonblack isolation score rose from roughly 20% to roughly 60%.63 A useful rule 
of thumb is that segregation scores are high if they are above 60%, moderate if 
between 30% and 60%, and low if below 30%.64 On this scale, the peak 
dissimilarity experienced by blacks was extraordinarily severe, high enough to 
warrant labels like “hypersegregation,”65 and the peak isolation was very 
troubling too.66  
Since 1970, though, the situation has changed markedly for the better. Black 
segregation scores have now fallen for four straight decades, undoing much of 
the rise that occurred during the twentieth century. According to Glaeser and 
Vigdor, black-nonblack dissimilarity reached 55% in 2010, or about the same 
level as in 1910, and black-nonblack isolation neared 30%, or close to its 1920 
threshold.67 Using a similar methodology, John Iceland and Gregory Sharp report 
nearly identical 2010 black-nonblack dissimilarity and isolation scores.68 Without 
weighting by black population, and using whites rather than nonblacks as the 
                                                                                                                         
tend not to change much when different subunits are used. See Sean F. Reardon et al., The Geographic Scale of 
Metropolitan Racial Segregation, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 489, 499 (2008). 
61 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 21, 24, 47 (providing dissimilarity index scores for selected 
cities from 1860 to 1970); Glaeser & Vigdor, supra note 11, at 4. 
62 See Glaeser & Vigdor, supra note 11, at 4. Unfortunately, Glaeser and Vigdor do not calculate black-
white segregation statistics, which are usually slightly higher. I am unaware of any work presenting black-white 
figures over such a long period. 
63 See id. Glaeser and Vigdor use an idiosyncratic definition of the isolation index, adjusting its values 
downward by the black share of the metropolitan area population. See id. at 3. The index then “measures the 
tendency for members of one group to live in neighborhoods where their share of the population is above the 
citywide average.” Id. (emphasis added). 
64 See, e.g., David M. Cutler et al., The Rise and Decline of the American Ghetto, 107 J. POL. ECON. 455, 
458 (1999); Rachel E. Dwyer, Poverty, Prosperity, and Place: The Shape of Class Segregation in the Age of 
Extremes, 57 SOC. PROBLEMS 114, 124 (2010). 
65 Massey & Denton, supra note 4, at 373. 
66 Measured the usual way, again, the peak isolation was somewhat higher than reported by Glaeser and 
Vigdor. See supra note 63; see also Rugh & Massey, supra note 14, at 213 (showing 1970 black-white isolation 
of about 67%). 
67 See Glaeser & Vigdor, supra note 11, at 4. 
68 See Iceland & Sharp, supra note 40, at 673 (providing data from 1980 to 2010). Their isolation index 
score of around 45% appears higher than Glaeser and Vigdor’s only because they do not adjust downward by 
the black share of the metropolitan area population. See supra note 63. 
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reference group, William Frey calculates an even lower 2010 black-white 
dissimilarity score of 47%.69 And both weighting and using whites as the 
reference group, Reynolds Farley,70 John Logan and Brian Stults,71 and Jacob 
Rugh and Massey72 arrive at black-white dissimilarity scores around 59%. No 
matter how it is computed, then, black segregation no longer qualifies as high for 
the first time in a hundred years. In fact, as David Cutler points out, it is about the 
same as the spatial separation currently experienced by immigrants from Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, and Russia.73 
What accounts for this striking improvement? I address underlying causes 
later, but the arithmetical explanation is twofold. First, within metropolitan areas, 
blacks increasingly are leaving heavily black neighborhoods and moving to 
communities with larger white populations—which now are more 
demographically stable than in the past. The neighborhoods blacks are exiting are 
largely inner-city ghettoes. Detroit and Chicago’s South and West Sides, for 
example, each lost close to 200,000 black residents from 2000 to 2010.74 The 
communities blacks are entering tend to be suburbs that formerly were mostly 
white but now are multiracial.75 But there also are numerous cases of urban 
neighborhoods, like Chicago’s Uptown, New York City’s Jackson Heights, and 
Oakland’s Fruitvale, developing impressive diversity.76 And the stability of 
newly integrated communities has increased over time, though they still are more 
prone to demographic transition than racially homogeneous neighborhoods.77 
                                                 
69 See FREY, supra note 11, at 173 (providing data from 1930 to 2010). 
70 See Farley, supra note 10, at 39 (providing data from 1980 to 2010). 
71 See Logan & Stults, supra note 39, at 4 (providing data from 1940 to 2010). However, Logan and Stults 
find that black-white exposure has been roughly constant since 1940, due to whites’ declining share of the 
overall population. See id. 
72 See Rugh & Massey, supra note 14, at 212 (providing data from 1970 to 2010). 
73 See David M. Cutler et al., Is the Melting Pot Still Hot? Explaining the Resurgence of Immigration 
Segregation, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 478, 482 (2008) (showing dissimilarity scores above 50% for all of these 
groups in 2000). 
74 See FREY, supra note 11, at 155; Glaeser & Vigdor, supra note 11, at 2 (“[T]he dominant trend in 
predominantly black neighborhoods nationwide has been population loss.”). This exodus seems to be fulfilling 
William Julius Wilson’s famous prediction that, as middle- and upper-income blacks exit inner-city areas, “the 
truly disadvantaged” will be left behind. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY 
DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987). A new frontier for civil 
rights law may be how to address the particular needs of “the truly disadvantaged,” as opposed to those of 
blacks generally.  
75 See Myron Orfield & Thomas F. Luce, America’s Racially Diverse Suburbs: Opportunities and 
Challenges, 23 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 395, 401 (2013) (finding that “diverse suburbs” now “represent the largest 
single suburban segment—53 million people in 2010, up from 40 million in 2000”); see also Ingrid Gould 
Ellen, How Integrated Did We Become During the 1990s?, in FRAGILE RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES 123, 130 (John 
Goering ed., 2007) (showing that proportion of nearly all-white tracts fell from about 60% in 1970 to about 15% 
in 2000). 
76 See MALY, supra note 9, at 48-213 (discussing these neighborhoods); Philip Nyden et al., The 
Emergence of Stable Racially and Ethnically Diverse Urban Communities: A Case Study of Nine U.S. Cities, 8 
HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 491, 492 (1997) (also surveying “communities where racial and ethnic diversity has been 
maintained for as long as 30 years”). 
77 See Ellen, supra note 75, at 134 (finding that stability of neighborhoods with black population between 
10% and 50% “rose from 62 percent during the 1970s to 78 percent during the 1980s . . . to 80 percent during 
the 1990s”); Chad R. Farrell & Barrett A. Lee, Racial Diversity and Change in Metropolitan Neighborhoods, 40 
SOC. SCI. RES. 1108, 1116-18 (2011) (finding that several types of integrated neighborhoods have stability rates 
above 50%, which are still lower than stability rates of homogeneous communities); Samantha Friedman, Do 
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Second, across metropolitan areas, blacks are migrating in large numbers 
from the Midwest and Northeast (where segregation levels are higher) to the 
South and West (where they are lower). The proportion of the country’s blacks 
living in the Midwest and Northeast fell from 50% in 1970 to 38% in 2007.78 
Over the same period, the South’s share rose from 41% to 52% as millions of 
blacks streamed to metropolitan areas like Atlanta, Charlotte, and Dallas.79 This 
reversal of the earlier Great Migration is responsible for up to one-fifth of the 
overall decline in segregation since 1970.80 
Also interestingly, desegregation is not taking place because of 
gentrification, at least not to any significant extent. Predominantly black 
neighborhoods are very stable, in that they are more than 80% likely to remain 
predominantly black from one Census to the next.81 These communities also are 
very unattractive to whites. Only about 2% of them achieve a substantial level of 
black-white integration over the course of a decade.82 True, there are several 
high-profile exceptions, like New York City’s Bushwick, Philadelphia’s 
University City, and Washington D.C.’s U Street Corridor.83 But for the most 
part, gentrification is a trend of modest bite, “occur[ing] primarily at the fringe of 
the ghetto.”84 
Turning next to Hispanic and Asian American segregation, reliable figures 
for them are available only for the last few decades. The Census did not ask 
about Hispanic status before 1970, and the Asian American population was too 
small prior to 1980 for its distribution to be analyzed accurately.85 During the 
period for which data exists, the situation has been essentially static. Hispanic 
dissimilarity has hovered around 50% and Asian American dissimilarity around 
40%—both squarely in the moderate zone.86 Figure 1 illustrates this point with a 
chart from a recent study by Rugh and Massey using whites as the reference 
group.87 Farley,88 Iceland and Sharp,89 and Logan and Stults90 reach virtually 
identical results using whites or non-minorities as the reference groups. Figure 1 
                                                                                                                         
Declines in Residential Segregation Mean Stable Neighborhood Racial Integration in Metropolitan America? A 
Research Note, 37 SOC. SCI. RES. 920, 927 (2008) (same). 
78 See Iceland et al., supra note 11, at 106. 
79 See id.; see also FREY, supra note 11, at 114-30. 
80 See Glaeser & Vigdor, supra note 11, at 9 (arriving at one-fifth figure); Iceland et al., supra note 11, at 
115 (finding that inter-regional migration accounts for 12% of decline in black-white dissimilarity and 8% of 
decline in black-nonblack dissimilarity). 
81 See Ellen, supra note 75, at 133; Farrell & Lee, supra note 77, at 1117; Friedman, supra note 77, at 927. 
82 See id. 
83 Cf. Terra McKinnish et al., Who Gentrifies Low-Income Neighborhoods?, 67 J. URB. ECON. 180, 185-
191 (2010) (analyzing dynamics of gentrification). 
84 Glaeser & Vigdor, supra note 11, at 9. 
85 See Iceland & Sharp, supra note 40, at 668 n.1 (“The challenge with using 1970 data is that one cannot 
distinguish between the ‘white’ and ‘non-Hispanic white’ population in census public use files. We also do not 
have data on the number of Asians in that year.”). 
86 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (noting that dissimilarity scores in 30%-60% range indicate 
moderate segregation). 
87 See Rugh & Massey, supra note 14, at 212-13. All of these studies weight metropolitan area values by 
the areas’ Hispanic or Asian American populations. 
88 See Farley, supra note 10, at 39 (using whites as reference group). 
89 See Iceland & Sharp, supra note 40, at 673 (using non-minorities as reference group). 
90 See Logan & Stults, supra note 39, at 11, 17 (using whites as reference group). 
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also shows that the isolation of Hispanics and Asian Americans has increased 
since 1980.91 The reason, of course, is the remarkable growth of these groups’ 
populations, which necessarily exposes their members to more of their racial 
peers.92 
But the placid surface of Hispanic and Asian American segregation hides 
some turbulence beneath. Hispanics and Asian Americans who were born in the 
United States have dissimilarity scores about 12% and 8% lower, respectively, 
than their foreign-born compatriots.93 Foreign-born Hispanics and Asian 
Americans also become steadily more integrated the longer they remain in the 
country.94 The stationary top-line statistics thus reflect two opposing forces 
fighting to a draw: on the one hand, surging immigration with its segregative 
impact, and on the other, the ongoing assimilation of longer-term residents.95 
The top-line figures for black segregation also are the product of several 
different forces. Justice Stewart once deemed these causes “unknown and 
perhaps unknowable.”96 But as I explain below, sociologists actually have 
learned a good deal about the drivers of racial separation. Because I am most 
interested in the decline in black segregation since 1970, I stress factors that 
themselves have shifted over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 See Rugh & Massey, supra note 14, at 213; see also Iceland & Sharp, supra note 40, at 673 (showing 
gentler rise due to use of non-minorities as reference group). 
92 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (noting that isolation index is sensitive to groups’ population 
shares). 
93 See ICELAND, supra note 51, at 58 (using whites as reference group). 
94 See id.; see also id. at 63-68 (showing similar results for specific countries of origin); Daniel T. Lichter 
et al., Residential Segregation in New Hispanic Destinations: Cities, Suburbs, and Rural Communities 
Compared, 39 SOC. SCI. RES. 215, 222 (2010) (finding that Hispanic-white segregation is higher in “new 
destinations” than in “established Hispanic places”). 
95 See FREY, supra note 11, at 178 (“[T]he average ‘static’ segregation picture for Hispanics and Asians 
conflates both a turn toward integration among long-term residents and higher segregation levels among new 
immigrants.”). 
96 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 756 n.2 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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FIGURE 1: TRENDS IN SEGREGATION97 
 
 
C. Causes 
 
Discrimination by public or private parties is one obvious explanation for 
segregation. If the government tries to confine minorities to certain areas—by 
reserving neighborhoods for different racial groups, refusing to provide mortgage 
assistance to mixed communities, restricting public housing to inner cities, and so 
on98—it is unsurprising that segregated residential patterns arise. Likewise, racial 
separation follows naturally from private actions such as landlords declining to 
rent to minorities, realtors steering customers on racial grounds, and threats of 
violence against minorities who dare to cross the color line.99 As American 
Apartheid vividly depicts, all of these practices (and more) were used for 
generations to create and maintain black segregation.100 
However, housing discrimination has been illegal since the FHA’s passage in 
1968, and two kinds of evidence show that its prevalence has, in fact, decreased. 
                                                 
97 See Glaeser & Vigdor, supra note 11, at 4; Rugh & Massey, supra note 14, at 212-13. 
98 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 17-59 (describing these and other discriminatory 
governmental policies). 
99 See id. at 83-114 (discussing these and other discriminatory private practices). 
100 See supra notes 98-99. 
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First, HUD has conducted four nationwide paired-test studies, initially in 1977 
and most recently in 2012.101 These studies rely on paired testers, matched in all 
respects except for race, to determine how often discrimination occurs.102 The 
idea is that if the minority tester is treated differently despite being as qualified as 
the non-minority tester, race must account for the disparity.103 As Figure 2 
reveals, both rental and sales discrimination, against both blacks and Hispanics, 
have declined since 1977.104 Blacks are now almost as likely as whites to be told 
that advertised properties are available (compared to differences as high as 20% 
for rental units in 1977).105 The probability that blacks will be shown fewer 
properties than whites also has fallen to less than 5% for rental units (from a 
1989 high of almost 20%).106 The figures for Hispanics reflect similar 
improvement, albeit from lower peaks.107 
Second, sociologists have investigated whether blacks pay more than whites 
for equivalent housing within a metropolitan area. If they do, it may be because 
their residential choices are constrained by public or private discrimination. In 
the absence of the discrimination, they presumably would move to more 
affordable neighborhoods. According to work by Cutler and his coauthors, the 
black housing premium was substantial in 1940, suggesting “collective action 
racism on the part of whites.”108 But by 1970 the premium had dropped by about 
75%, and by 1990 it actually had switched signs, indicating that blacks paid less 
than whites for comparable accommodation.109 Other scholars report similar 
results; as Stephen Ross notes, “not a single study has found evidence that 
African Americans paid more for housing during the 1980s or 1990s.”110 
Moreover, not only is housing discrimination falling, but its decline has been 
linked causally to lower segregation. George Galster used the HUD paired-test 
data to measure the incidence of discriminatory practices in different 
metropolitan areas, as well as black-white dissimilarity scores to assess 
segregation.111 He found that discrimination is a powerful determinant of racial 
separation. “If we could somehow eliminate discrimination in both rental and 
sales sectors . . . we would predict . . . a 25-point (50 percent) decrease in the 
                                                 
101 See TURNER ET AL., supra note 15, at xix. 
102 See id. at 5-11 (discussing paired testing protocols). 
103 See id. at 3 (“When large numbers of consistent and comparable tests are conducted . . . they directly 
measure patterns of adverse treatment based on race or ethnicity.”). 
104 See id. at 68. 
105 All of these percentages are net figures that indicate how often the non-minority tester is favored minus 
how often the minority tester is favored. See id. at xii. 
106 See id. at 68. However, the trend for homes is more static. See id. 
107 See id. For examples of other scholars noticing these encouraging developments, see Ingrid Gould 
Ellen, Continuing Isolation: Segregation in America Today, in SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR 
AMERICA 261, 265 (James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 2008); and Bo Zhao et al., Why Do Real Estate 
Brokers Continue to Discriminate? Evidence from the 2000 Housing Discrimination Study, 59 J. URB. ECON. 
394, 409 (2006). 
108 Cutler et al., supra note 64, at 483. 
109 See id. at 483-87. 
110 Stephen L. Ross, Understanding Racial Segregation: What Is Known About the Effect of Housing 
Discrimination 17 (Apr. 1, 2008). 
111 See George C. Galster, Housing Discrimination and Urban Poverty of African-Americans, 2 J. HOUS. 
RESEARCH 87, 94-107 (1991). 
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index of segregation within the black community.”112 This is a large effect, and it 
helps explain why discrimination and segregation have decreased in tandem over 
the last few decades.113 
An alternative account of segregation attributes it to racial groups’ divergent 
residential preferences. Thomas Schelling popularized this explanation in a 
famous 1971 paper.114 He explained how almost complete racial separation could 
arise even if there is no discrimination and most whites and blacks are willing to 
live in integrated neighborhoods.115 The crux of the problem is that whites and 
blacks often mean different things by integration. Whites may be willing to 
tolerate communities up to, say, 20% black, while blacks may prefer areas that 
are, say, 50% black.116 In this scenario, blacks will continue entering a 
neighborhood until it is evenly split. But whites will exit when the black 
population hits 20%, thus producing segregation despite both groups’ wishes to 
the contrary.117 
The extent of racial separation in Schelling’s model is highly sensitive to 
whites’ preferences.118 And on this front too, the trends are encouraging. Farley 
carried out surveys of white Detroit-area residents in 1976, 1992, and 2004, each 
time asking about their views of neighborhoods in which one to seven out of 
fifteen homes are owned by blacks.119 As Figure 2 displays, all of the change in 
this period favored integration.120 For instance, with respect to a community that 
is one-fifth black, 83% of whites said they would feel comfortable living there in 
2004 (versus 58% in 1976), and 8% said they would leave the area (versus 
24%).121 Nationwide polls asking whether whites would sell their homes if blacks 
came to live “next door” or “in great numbers in your neighborhood” point to 
similar progress.122 By the late 1990s, almost no whites said they would sell if 
blacks moved in next door (versus nearly 40% in 1965), and about 30% said they 
would sell if faced with great numbers of blacks (versus about 70%).123 
                                                 
112 Id. at 113. 
113 Cf. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 109 (commenting that Galster “confirmed the empirical link 
between discrimination and segregation”). 
114 See Thomas C. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J. MATH. SOC. 143 (1971). 
115 See id. at 149-86. 
116 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 8, at 1987 (also using these assumptions). 
117 See id. at 1985-87 (discussing “tipping” phenomenon); Schelling, supra note 114, at 181-86 (same). 
There are additional complexities to Schelling’s model, such as the distributions of whites’ and blacks’ 
preferences, that I do not address here. 
118 See Schelling, supra note 114, at 171 (“The outcome depends on the shapes we attribute to the 
tolerance schedules . . . .”). 
119 See Farley, supra note 10, at 39-41. 
120 See id. at 40. 
121 See id. For examples of other scholars noting this improvement, see Camille Zubrinsky Charles, The 
Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 167, 184 (2003); and David R. Harris, Why Are 
Whites and Blacks Averse to Black Neighbors?, 30 SOC. SCI. RES. 100, 101 (2001). Black residential preferences 
largely held steady over this period, reflecting “a clear preference for 50/50 neighborhoods.” Camille Zubrinsky 
Charles, Who Will Live Near Whom?, POVERTY & RACE, Sept./Oct. 2008. 
122 Lawrence D. Bobo, Racial Attitudes and Relations at the Close of the Twentieth Century, in 1 
AMERICA BECOMING: RACIAL TRENDS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 264, 270 (Neil J. Smelser et al. eds., 2001). 
123 See id.; see also HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND 
INTERPRETATIONS 112 (1985) (showing similar trends through early 1980s). 
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Of course, survey results can be criticized on the ground that respondents are 
reluctant to admit to racist preferences. But Cutler and his coauthors find that 
self-professed views are tied to actual segregation levels.124 Black-white 
dissimilarity scores are higher in metropolitan areas where more whites believe 
that “[w]hite people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods” and 
oppose “living in a neighborhood where half of your neighbors [are] black.”125 
Also persuasively, David Card and his coauthors calculate “tipping points”—the 
black population shares above which whites exit neighborhoods en masse—for 
several metropolitan areas over time.126 In Midwestern cities like Chicago and 
Detroit, tipping points increased from almost 0% in 1940 to roughly 10% in 
1990.127 Nationwide, they rose from about 9% in the 1970s to about 14% in the 
1990s.128 People’s answers to polls, it seems, are not just cheap talk. 
That people’s answers are improving, though, leaves open the question of 
why this shift is occurring. Part of the story surely is a society-wide decline in 
anti-black racism.129 But as Logan and Charles Zhang show, another piece is the 
growth of Hispanic and Asian American immigration—and the accompanying 
rise in the number of neighborhoods with sizable white, black, Hispanic, and 
Asian American contingents.130 These multiracial communities are quite stable, 
enduring into the next decade about 75% of the time.131 Both whites and blacks 
also are willing to move into them, in contrast to most other neighborhood 
types.132 And the more whites and blacks that entered them from 1980 to 2000, 
the more steeply metropolitan areas’ black-white dissimilarity scores fell.133 
These findings suggest that whites are now more willing to live with blacks, at 
least in part, because they do not have to live only with blacks. Hispanics and 
Asian Americans increasingly serve as buffers that convince whites not to leave 
communities with substantial black populations.134 
                                                 
124 See Cutler et al., supra note 64, at 488-90. 
125 Id.; see also Rugh & Massey, supra note 14, at 216 (finding that anti-black racism, measured by 
frequency of Google searches for racial slurs, is powerful driver of black-white dissimilarity index). 
126 See David Card et al., Tipping and the Dynamics of Segregation, 123 Q.J. ECON. 177, 180-91 (2008) 
[hereinafter Card et al., Tipping]; David Card et al., Are Mixed Neighborhoods Always Unstable? Two-Sided 
and One-Sided Tipping 5-13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper 14470, Nov. 2008) [hereinafter 
Card et al., Mixed]. 
127 See Card et al., Mixed, supra note 126, at 21. 
128 See Card et al., Tipping, supra note 126, at 192. 
129 See generally SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 123 (finding decreases in racism in many areas); Iceland & 
Sharp, supra note 40, at 666 (“The proportion of Whites holding blatantly racist attitudes has dropped 
considerably over the decades . . . .”). 
130 See Logan & Zhang, supra note 18, at 1087 (showing increase in number of multiracial “WBHA” 
tracts from 2,422 in 1980 to 3,792 in 2000). 
131 See id. at 1093; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting greater stability of multiracial 
neighborhoods). 
132 See Logan & Zhang, supra note 18, at 1091-92 (showing that almost all WBHA tracts experienced 
increases in their white and black population shares in 1980-2000 period). 
133 See id. 
134 See FREY, supra note 11, at 174 (noting that “other minorities can serve to ‘buffer’ these [white-black] 
divisions”); ICELAND, supra note 51, at 6 (observing that “immigration has softened the black-white divide”). 
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A final set of causes of segregation involve metropolitan areas’ 
characteristics.135 Studies by several scholars conclude that residential patterns, to 
some degree, are a function of areas’ demographics, housing stock, and policies. 
In particular: Total metropolitan area population is linked to higher 
segregation.136 Areas where more residents belong to the military tend to be less 
segregated.137 Areas where more housing has been constructed in the previous 
decade also usually exhibit less racial separation.138 And the more permissive an 
area’s zoning regime (measured by the weighted average of the development 
densities allowed by each of the jurisdictions within it), the lower the area’s 
segregation.139 
These factors have contributed to the decline in black segregation because 
they favor the Southern and Western metropolitan areas to which blacks have 
been migrating.140 Iceland and his coauthors observe that Southern and Western 
areas have fewer total residents, larger military populations, and newer housing 
stock than their Midwestern and Northeastern peers.141 Similarly, Jonathan 
Rothwell notes that “[w]ith respect to density regulation, the West is the most 
liberal, followed by the South, and both are significantly more liberal than the 
Midwest and Northeast.”142 As blacks move from areas whose attributes worsen 
segregation to areas with more favorable profiles, less racial separation is the 
predictable result. 
On balance, my reading of the relevant literature is therefore optimistic. By 
any metric, black segregation has fallen sharply since 1970, and this decrease is 
backed fully by positive trends in the forces that drive racial separation. What is 
more, there is no reason why this progress should halt in the future. As Iceland 
writes, “multiple forms of assimilation [should] largely reduce the significance of 
                                                 
135 People’s incomes are still another potential driver of segregation. It could arise because different racial 
groups have different average incomes, and so can afford to live in different neighborhoods. Historically, 
income made almost no difference for black segregation; rich blacks were just about as racially separated as 
poor blacks. Other factors, such as housing discrimination and divergent residential preferences, thus were 
responsible for black segregation. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 3, at 86; Camille Zubrinsky 
Charles, Neighborhood Racial-Composition Preferences: Evidence from a Multiethnic Metropolis, 47 SOC. 
PROBS. 379, 380 (2000). But in recent years, income has become a better predictor of how segregated blacks 
are. Wealthy blacks are now substantially less racially separated than disadvantaged ones. This confirms the 
account of discrimination and residential preferences no longer obstructing integration to the same extent. See, 
e.g., ICELAND, supra note 51, at 47; Lincoln Quillian, Why Is Black-White Residential Segregation So 
Persistent? Evidence on Three Theories from Migration Data, 31 SOC. FORCES 197, 218 (2002). 
136 See Iceland et al., supra note 11, at 110; John R. Logan et al., Segregation of Minorities in the 
Metropolis: Two Decades of Change, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 1, 15 (2004); Rugh & Massey, supra note 14, at 217; 
Timberlake & Iceland, supra note 50, at 352. 
137 See id. (all studies reporting same findings). 
138 See id. (same). 
139 See Jonathan T. Rothwell, Racial Enclaves and Density Zoning: The Institutionalized Segregation of 
Racial Minorities in the United States, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 290, 314 (2011); Jonathan Rothwell & Douglas 
S. Massey, The Effect of Density Zoning on Racial Segregation in U.S. Urban Areas, 44 URB. AFFAIRS REV. 
779, 792 (2009); Rugh & Massey, supra note 14, at 217. 
140 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing black migration patterns). 
141 See Iceland et al., supra note 11, at 112. 
142 Rothwell, supra note 139, at 345; see also Rothwell & Massey, supra note 139, at 793. 
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various color lines in metropolitan America.”143 However, it is important not to 
paint too rosy a picture. As I next discuss, American residential patterns remain 
troubling in several respects. These problems do not contradict the account I have 
given so far, but they do cast a considerable shadow. 
 
FIGURE 2: CAUSES OF SEGREGATION144 
 
 
D. Caveats 
 
The most critical caveat is that black segregation is still severe in numerous 
metropolitan areas, especially in the Midwest and Northeast. According to the 
                                                 
143 ICELAND, supra note 51, at 104; see also, e.g., FREY, supra note 11, at 176 (“[N]ew forces affecting 
black-white segregation are ushering in an era that will be quite different from the era of wholesale 
ghettoization of the black population.”). 
144 See TURNER ET AL., supra note 15, at 68; Farley, supra note 10, at 40. 
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2010 Census, more than 70% of blacks would have to switch neighborhoods to 
achieve an even black-white distribution in Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Miami, 
Milwaukee, Newark, New York City, Philadelphia, and St. Louis.145 Another 
twelve areas have black-white dissimilarity scores above 60% (and so in the high 
zone).146 The scores in these areas also are not improving as quickly as in the rest 
of the country. As shown in Figure 3, which is taken from a study by Iceland and 
his coauthors,147 black-white dissimilarity declined at a markedly lower rate from 
1970 to 2007 in the Midwest and Northeast than in the South and West. These 
statistics mean that far too many blacks continue to be trapped in highly 
segregated communities rife with poverty and crime.148 
A related point is that the gains in black integration are fragile; they may be 
reversed, or at least slowed, by economic setbacks. During the financial crisis of 
the late 2000s, for example, foreclosure rates were almost four times as high in 
racially mixed neighborhoods (8.6%) as in heavily white ones (2.3%).149 Many 
whites in mixed communities responded to the housing market’s deterioration by 
moving to more homogeneously white areas. As Matthew Hall and his coauthors 
find, the white population share in mixed neighborhoods dropped by 0.3% from 
2000 to 2010 for every one-point increase in the local foreclosure rate.150 A 
consequence of this white exit was a rise of about 1% in the black-white 
dissimilarity index.151 That is, black segregation would have fallen by roughly 
1% more over the decade had the financial crisis not struck.152 
Another proviso has to do with the geographic level at which integration is 
occurring. Blacks and whites living in tracts within center cities and suburbs now 
are substantially less separated than they were in earlier periods.153 But black-
white segregation between center cities and their surrounding suburbs, and from 
                                                 
145 See Logan & Stults, supra note 39, at 6 (only covering fifty metropolitan areas with largest black 
populations). 
146 See id.; see also Glaeser & Vigdor, supra note 11, at 11-26 (providing 2010 black-nonblack 
dissimilarity scores for all metropolitan areas). 
147 See Iceland et al., supra note 11, at 107; see also Rugh & Massey, supra note 14, at 221 (showing very 
slow black-white dissimilarity decline for five most segregated metropolitan areas). 
148 For a sampling of the vast literature documenting the ill effects of segregation, see MASSEY & DENTON, 
supra note 3, at 1-16, 115-216; OLIVER, supra note 59, at 147; Charles, supra note 121, at 197-99; and Cutler et 
al., supra note 64, at 761-62. Based on this literature, I assume here that integration is desirable and segregation 
is an evil to be avoided. But due to space constraints, I do not defend this assumption at any length. 
149 See Matthew Hall et al., Neighborhood Foreclosures, Racial/Ethnic Transitions, and Residential 
Segregation, 80 AM. SOC. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 9); see also Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. 
Massey, Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 639 (2010) (finding 
that foreclosure rate was higher in metropolitan areas with higher black-white dissimilarity scores). 
150 See Hall et al., supra note 149 (manuscript at 11). 
151 See id. (manuscript at 15) (also finding rise of about 2% in Hispanic-white dissimilarity index). 
152 See id.; see also Richard Rothstein, A Comment on Bank of America/Countrywide’s Discriminatory 
Mortgage Lending and Its Implications for Racial Segregation 3 (EPI Briefing Paper #335, Jan. 23, 2012) 
(speculating that blacks whose homes were foreclosed may have had to “return to more racially isolated and 
poorer ghettos,” thus also increasing black segregation). 
153 See Fischer et al., supra note 46, at 47 (providing data from 1960 to 2000); Daniel T. Lichter et al., 
Toward a New Macro-Segregation? Decomposing Segregation Within and Between Metropolitan Cities and 
Suburbs, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 843, 856 (2015) (providing data from 1990 to 2010). 
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one suburb to another, has stayed roughly constant.154 The main driver of the 
country’s desegregative trend thus is greater black-white intermingling within 
individual municipalities. Racial separation at the inter- (as opposed to intra-) 
municipality level has not declined noticeably. 
Still another red flag is (largely) non-racial. Segregation along 
socioeconomic lines, such as income, education, and profession, has surged since 
1970. Recent work by Sean Reardon and Kendra Bischoff, which also is 
displayed in Figure 3,155 makes this point with respect to income. The rank-order 
entropy index, which measures the extent to which tracts’ income distributions 
diverge from that of the metropolitan area as a whole,156 increased from about 
12% in 1970 to about 16% in 2000.157 This rise was propelled by growing 
income inequality,158 and it was the wealthy who were most segregated from 
other income groups throughout this period.159 Massey and his coauthors come to 
similar conclusions for education and profession. The dissimilarity index for high 
school and college graduates increased from roughly 20% in 1970 to roughly 
35% in 2000.160 Dissimilarity between blue- and white-collar workers also rose 
from about 12% to about 17%.161 
And there are two reasons why race is implicated here too. First, as Rachel 
Dwyer shows, the rich and the poor are more likely to be separated spatially in 
metropolitan areas that have larger black populations and higher black-white 
dissimilarity scores.162 Black segregation appears to fuel income segregation. 
Second, as Figure 3 further illustrates, income segregation within the black 
population is now higher, and has increased at a faster rate, than intra-white 
income segregation.163 This development may be attributable to the movement of 
middle- and upper-income blacks to suburban areas, away from the poorer blacks 
remaining in inner cities.164 Whatever its cause, the rise in intra-black income 
segregation means that the rise in overall income segregation is not due to 
growing income inequality alone. Race, as ever, continues to be part of the story. 
                                                 
154 See id. Notably, Lichter et al. report a rise in the share of total segregation explained by macro 
components, but the actual level of macro segregation has remained about the same. See Lichter et al., supra 
note 153, at 856. 
155 See Reardon & Bischoff, supra note 41, at 1117. 
156 See id. at 1110-14 (referring to metric as “rank-order information theory index”).  
157 See id. at 1117; see also, e.g., SEAN F. REARDON & KENDRA BISCHOFF, GROWTH IN THE RESIDENTIAL 
SEGREGATION OF FAMILIES BY INCOME, 1970-2009, at 16 (2011) (showing increases in segregation of high- and 
low-income families from 1970 to 2007); Fischer, supra note 46, at 50 (same for 1960-2000 period); Douglas S. 
Massey et al., The Changing Bases of Segregation in the United States, 626 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 74, 82 (2009) (showing increases in neighborhood sorting index and poor-rich dissimilarity from 1970 to 
2000). 
158 See Reardon & Bischoff, supra note 41, at 1138 (concluding that “increasing income inequality was 
responsible for 40%-80% of the changes in income segregation from 1970 to 2000”). 
159 See id. at 1120; see also REARDON & BISCHOFF, supra note 157, at 16; Fischer, supra note 46, at 50. 
160 See Massey et al., supra note 157, at 84. 
161 See id. at 86 (calculating index using congressional districts as subunits).  
162 See Dwyer, supra note 64, at 130; see also RICHARD FLORIDA & CHARLOTTA MELLANDER, 
SEGREGATED CITY: THE GEOGRAPHY OF ECONOMIC SEGREGATION IN AMERICA’S METROS 19-20 (2015) (also 
finding that wealthy are more segregated in metropolitan areas with higher black population shares). 
163 See Reardon & Bischoff, supra note 41, at 1117. 
164 See id. at 1139. 
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A final caveat is that while black-white separation is decreasing, no 
comparable progress is being made in many other areas. The black-white gap in 
median household income has remained constant over the last fifty years.165 So 
has the black-white difference in life expectancy.166 The gulf between black and 
white incarceration rates has grown substantially since 1960.167 And as I have 
found in earlier work, blacks remain politically powerless relative to whites, at 
both the federal and state levels.168 These statistics are highly troubling and call 
for both academic analysis and policy change. But they are not the subject of this 
Article, which is limited to housing patterns and their consequences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
165 See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 2011, at 5 (2012). 
166 See QuickStats: Life Expectancy at Birth, by Race and Sex: United States, 1970-2007, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 17, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ 
mm5936a9.htm. 
167 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., KING’S DREAM REMAINS AN ELUSIVE GOAL: MANY AMERICANS SEE 
RACIAL DISPARITIES 31 (2013). 
168 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) 
(manuscript at 43-60). 
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FIGURE 3: CAVEATS ABOUT SEGREGATION169 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
The above discussion was so detailed because the phenomenon it described is 
so surprising to many legal observers. Given America’s fraught racial history, 
black desegregation is not a trend that can be asserted without extensive 
documentation. From this point forward, though, I take as a given the decline in 
black-white separation, and turn my attention from sociology to law. My goal is 
to explore the implications of rising integration for the three civil rights domains 
                                                 
169 See Iceland et al., supra note 11, at 107; Reardon & Bischoff, supra note 41, at 1117. 
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most closely linked to racial groups’ residential patterns: the Fair Housing Act, 
the Voting Rights Act, and school desegregation law. For each area, I show how 
it historically has depended on the existence of segregation, how it is unsettled by 
desegregation, and how it might be reconsidered in a less racially separated 
society. 
Two more points before continuing: First, it is true that other civil rights 
statutes are related to residential patterns too. The Community Reinvestment Act 
aims to prevent “redlining,” or discrimination in mortgage lending against 
minority-heavy areas.170 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act imposes on school 
districts receiving federal funds some of the same obligations created by the 
Constitution.171 Title VII employment discrimination cases often consider how 
companies’ applicant pools are shaped by racial segregation in the region.172 And 
so forth. In my judgment, though, these ties are not as significant as the ones of 
the areas I address. These areas also seem like more than enough ground for a 
single Article to cover. 
Second, because the legal literature neither has traced the links between civil 
rights law and segregation nor has noticed the trend toward desegregation, I rely 
primarily on court decisions below. These decisions, by the Supreme Court as 
well as lower bodies, dramatize how closely the doctrine is connected to racial 
groups’ residential patterns. They illustrate the many ways in which segregation 
traditionally has assisted plaintiffs—and in which integration increasingly 
benefits defendants. Of course, the decisions I highlight are not chosen at 
random. But even though they are not a representative sample, they still 
demonstrate that race and place are crucial building blocks of the civil rights 
edifice. 
 
II. FAIR HOUSING ACT 
 
The Fair Housing Act is the logical law with which to begin. Residential 
segregation and integration are, at their core, properties of people’s housing, and 
it is the FHA that deals most directly with the racial aspects of the housing 
market. In this Part, I first identify the various ways in which segregation 
historically has facilitated the imposition of liability and aggressive remedies 
under the FHA. It has given rise to standing; supported findings of disparate 
treatment, disparate impact, and failure to further integration affirmatively; and 
justified far-reaching remedial measures. 
Next, I argue that all of these pillars of FHA doctrine are shaken by 
desegregation. Standing is harder to establish in stably integrated areas. Actors in 
these areas also often cannot be held liable on any theory, whether based on 
intent, effect, or effort. And potent remedies are both less necessary and more 
likely to be deemed unlawful. Lastly, I offer a sketch of how the FHA might 
                                                 
170 The Act is codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-08. 
171 Title VI is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-1-7. 
172 See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 647-48 (1989) (linking “racial 
stratification of the work force” to “racially segregated housing”). 
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operate in a more integrated future environment. The statute’s desegregative 
components might go into a kind of remission, remaining available in theory but 
seldom being used successfully in practice. But its antidiscrimination173 
provisions would remain (almost) as vital as ever. 
 
A. Connection 
 
The FHA prohibits an array of housing-related actions from being taken 
“because of race [or] color.”174 Among other things, parties cannot “refuse to sell 
or rent,” “discriminate . . . in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or 
rental,” “represent . . . that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or 
rental,” or “otherwise make unavailable or deny[] a dwelling” on racial 
grounds.175 The FHA also announces that “[i]t is the policy of the United States 
to provide . . . for fair housing throughout [the country],”176 and requires all 
federal agencies involved in administering the law “affirmatively to further [its] 
purposes.”177 
Like most causes of action, the FHA can be divided into three topics: 
standing, liability, and remedy. In turn—and as recently confirmed by the 
Supreme Court178—liability under the statute can come about in three ways: 
disparate treatment, disparate impact, and failure to further the law’s purposes 
affirmatively. As I explain below, the segregated residential patterns that 
persisted for much of the FHA’s history (and that still persist in several 
metropolitan areas today) made all of these elements easier to prove. If not quite 
indispensable, segregation at least was highly conducive to the success of 
plaintiffs’ claims.179 
Start with standing to file suit. In a trio of early decisions, the Court held that 
plaintiffs have standing if they live in areas that are segregated, or threaten to 
become segregated, because of defendants’ actions. In a 1972 case, the claimants 
were tenants in a San Francisco apartment complex that was almost all-white due 
to the landlord’s discrimination against nonwhite applicants.180 The Court agreed 
that the claimants had been injured by “los[ing] the social benefits of living in an 
integrated community” and “being ‘stigmatized’ as residents of a ‘white 
ghetto.’”181 Likewise, in cases from 1979 and 1982, the plaintiffs lived in mixed 
neighborhoods within the Chicago and Richmond metropolitan areas, 
                                                 
173 To be clear about terms, I am distinguishing discrimination from segregation here, not from disparate 
impact. Both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims can proceed under both antidiscrimination and 
desegregation theories. 
174 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06. 
175 Id. § 3604(a), (b), (d). 
176 Id. § 3601. 
177 Id. § 3608(d). 
178 See Inclusive Communities, 2015 WL 2473449, at *17 (holding that disparate impact theory is 
cognizable under FHA).  
179 I note that I only cover elements of FHA (and VRA and school desegregation) doctrine that are linked 
to racial groups’ residential patterns. I do not discuss the numerous doctrinal elements that are unrelated to 
segregation or integration. 
180 See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 206-07 (1972). 
181 Id. at 208. 
27                                             Desegregating America 
 
 
 
respectively, that were segregating due to racial steering by realtors.182 Here too 
the plaintiffs were harmed because the “transformation of their neighborhood 
from an integrated to a predominantly Negro community . . . depriv[ed] them of 
‘the social and professional benefits of living in an integrated society.’”183 
Importantly, the Court based its conclusion that standing follows from 
segregation on its understanding of the FHA’s purposes. The Court observed in 
the 1972 case that the law does not only target “discriminatory housing 
practices.”184 Rather, it also aims to “replace the ghettos ‘by truly integrated and 
balanced living patterns,’” as the FHA’s architect, Senator Walter Mondale, put 
it.185 Other legislative history confirms the statute’s dual goals of 
antidiscrimination and desegregation. One key congressman stated that the FHA 
would combat the “blight of segregated housing and the pale of the ghetto.”186 
Another commented that the law would help “achieve the aim of an integrated 
society.”187 These remarks provide context for the Court’s position that plaintiffs 
in segregated (or segregating) areas suffer a cognizable injury. Even if they are 
not subjected to discrimination, they are victims of another ill that the FHA seeks 
to cure. 
Next consider theories of liability under the FHA, the first (and most 
common188) of which is invidious intent demonstrated by disparate treatment of 
similarly situated individuals. Evidence that segregation is high in an area, in part 
because of a defendant’s actions, does not prove that the defendant had a 
discriminatory or segregative motive. But as courts often have recognized, it is 
strong circumstantial support for the proposition. For instance, almost all of 
Yonkers’s minority residents lived in its southwest quadrant in the 1980s, and its 
other neighborhoods were almost entirely white.189 This pattern had several 
causes, one of which was the city’s policy, followed for nearly half a century, of 
placing essentially all public housing units in the same minority-heavy zone.190 
This combination of severe racial separation and a “pattern and practice of 
                                                 
182 See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 376 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of 
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 95 (1979) (noting that steering “is affecting the village’s racial composition, replacing 
what is presently an integrated neighborhood with a segregated one”). 
183 Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 111; see also Havens, 455 U.S. at 376. 
184 Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211. 
185 Id. (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 2706 (1968)); see also Inclusive Communities, 2015 WL 2473449, at *17 
(“The Court acknowledges the Fair Housing Act’s continuing role in moving the Nation toward a more 
integrated society.”). 
186 114 CONG. REC. 9559 (1968) (statement of Rep. Celler). 
187 114 CONG. REC. 9591 (1968) (statement of Rep. Ryan); see also SCHWEMM, supra note 6, at §2:3 
(“This legislative history makes clear that residential integration is a major goal of the Fair Housing Act, 
separate and independent of the goal of expanding minority housing opportunities.”); Implementation of the 
Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (“[T]he elimination 
of segregation is central to why the Fair Housing Act was enacted.”). 
188 See SCHWEMM, supra note 6, at § 10-2 (noting that disparate treatment claims “account for most of the 
litigation under the Fair Housing Act”). 
189 See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1219 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Census statistics 
about segregation in Yonkers). 
190 See id. at 1186-93 (recounting city’s housing decisions from 1940s to 1980s). 
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confining subsidized housing to Southwest Yonkers” convinced the Second 
Circuit that the city had “intentionally enhanced racial segregation.”191 
Illicit intent was inferred from segregation on even starker facts in a 1980 
case involving Parma, a suburb of Cleveland. Parma was “virtually all-white” in 
this era, while “[a]n extreme condition of racial segregation exist[ed] in the 
Cleveland metropolitan area.”192 Parma maintained its racial homogeneity 
through “opposition to any form of public or low-income housing,” as well as 
strict zoning regulations and the “creation of [an] image of racial exclusion” by 
the town’s political leaders.193 Faced with this evidence, the court concluded, 
“These actions . . . are evidence of a segregative intent. They had a segregative 
effect which was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen.”194 
A second FHA theory is disparate impact—and one of the ways it may be 
shown, in the words of a recent HUD regulation, is that “[a] practice creates, 
increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns.”195 The link 
between racial separation and liability could not be clearer here. Segregation 
itself, as long as it is partly attributable to the challenged practice, represents a 
prima facie case of an FHA violation.196 One type of policy that numerous 
plaintiffs have challenged successfully on this basis is a zoning restriction that 
prevents low-income developments (which would be attractive to minorities) 
from being built in a heavily white area.197 For example, Sunnyvale, an almost 
all-white suburb of Dallas, banned apartments outright and imposed a one-acre 
requirement for homes in the 1990s.198 These policies caused Sunnyvale’s 
                                                 
191 Id. at 1184; see also id. at 1222 (concluding that given “the impact of the City’s decisions,” Yonkers’s 
claim that it lacked “a segregative purpose” was “frivolous”). 
192 United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1055-56 (N.D. Ohio 1980); see also id. at 1055-65 
(discussing levels and causes of segregation in Cleveland area). 
193 Id. at 1066, 1072; see also id. at 1065-94 (discussing Parma’s racially exclusionary policies). 
194 Id. at 1097. For other examples of segregation helping to establish discriminatory intent, see Zach v. 
Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1054 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (involving racial steering by realtors in Detroit 
metropolitan area); and Kennedy Park Homes Ass’n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669, 695 (W.D.N.Y. 
1970) (involving Buffalo suburb’s refusal to approve low-income housing). See also Valerie Schneider, In 
Defense of Disparate Impact: Urban Redevelopment and the Supreme Court’s Recent Interest in the Fair 
Housing Act, 79 MO. L. REV. 539, 566 (2014) (“[D]isparate impact evidence can be properly used to help prove 
disparate treatment claims.”). 
195 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a); see also SCHWEMM, supra note 6, at § 13:12 (noting that disparate impact 
liability arises if “the defendant’s action . . . perpetuate[s] residential segregation in an area”). 
196 The circuits differ in exactly what doctrinal steps follow after a plaintiff has established that a 
defendant’s practice perpetuates segregation. See Inclusive Cmties. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and 
Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 275, 281 (5th Cir. 2014) (listing various judicial approaches). A 2013 HUD rule 
recommends that, after a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, (1) the defendant “has the burden of proving 
that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
interests,” and then (2) if this burden is met, the “plaintiff may still prevail upon proving that the . . . interests 
supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.” 24 
C.F.R. § 100.500(c). The Supreme Court recently referred favorably to this framework. See Inclusive 
Communities, 2015 WL 2473449, at *5, 14. 
197 For other examples of zoning restrictions leading to disparate impact liability, see Metro. Hous. Dev. 
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1291 (7th Cir. 1977) (perpetuation of segregation by 
Chicago suburb’s refusal to rezone to allow construction of low-income housing); and United States v. City of 
Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974) (same by St. Louis suburb’s refusal). See also Inclusive 
Communities, 2015 WL 2473449, at *13 (referring to such cases as “heartland of disparate-impact liability”).  
198 See Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale, 109 F. Supp. 2d 526, 529 (N.D. Tex. 2000). 
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housing to be unaffordable for most minorities, thus “perpetuat[ing] segregation 
in a town that is 97 percent white” and breaching the FHA.199 
Another practice that frequently has been deemed unlawful because of its 
segregative effect is the restriction of public housing to minority-heavy 
neighborhoods.200 If minorities apply to live in the public housing in 
disproportionate numbers (as is usually the case), then its siting worsens, or at 
least does not improve, existing segregation. My home city of Chicago aptly 
illustrates this scenario of public housing placement giving rise to liability. In 
litigation that spanned decades201 and was memorialized in a well-known book,202 
it emerged that “substantially all of the sites for family public housing selected 
by [the Chicago Housing Authority] . . . were located ‘within the areas known as 
the Negro Ghetto.’”203 The Supreme Court not only upheld the Seventh Circuit’s 
holding that the law had been violated, but also sustained its order that sweeping 
metropolitan area-wide relief be granted.204 
A third FHA theory is that a federal agency (typically HUD) has failed 
“affirmatively to further the [statute’s] purposes.”205 Since integration is one of 
these purposes, liability may follow from persistent segregation that the 
government has not tried sufficiently to reduce.206 A high-profile case of 
inadequate desegregative effort arose in the 2000s in the Baltimore metropolitan 
area, where most blacks live in the city and most whites live in the adjoining 
county.207 Throughout the 1990s, HUD located public housing units almost 
exclusively in the city and distributed Section 8 vouchers that also were used 
primarily within the city limits.208 HUD’s failure to consider regional responses 
to segregation amounted to a lack of affirmative furtherance of the FHA’s 
goals.209 As the court concluded, “It is high time that HUD live up to its statutory 
                                                 
199 See id. at 568. 
200 For other examples of public housing placement leading to disparate impact liability, see King v. 
Harris, 464 F. Supp. 827, 835 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), vac’d, 446 U.S. 905 (1980) (holding that new public housing in 
Staten Island neighborhood near racial tipping point “will insure the ghettoization of the area”); and Blackshear 
Residents Org. v. Hous. Auth’y, 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1141 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (describing how public housing 
units in black, Hispanic, and white areas of Austin had racial majorities corresponding to their locations). 
201 The culmination of the litigation was the Supreme Court’s decision in Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 
(1976).  
202 See ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX: A STORY OF SEGREGATION, HOUSING, AND 
THE BLACK GHETTO (2006). 
203 Hills, 425 U.S. at 286. 
204 See id. at 296-306. 
205 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d); see also Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Final Rule, ___ Fed. Reg. ___ 
(July 8, 2015) (new HUD regulation specifying local jurisdictions’ responsibilities for promoting integration). 
206 For other examples of inadequate integrative effort leading to liability, see NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 1987) (HUD not pursuing desegregation with sufficient vigor in Boston 
metropolitan area); and Shannon v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 822 (3d Cir. 1970) (same 
in Philadelphia metropolitan area). Section 3608(d) itself does not create a private right of action; rather, it 
enables claims under the Administrative Procedure Act that a federal agency has behaved arbitrarily or 
capriciously. See NAACP, 817 F.2d at 157-60. 
207 See Thompson v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 406 (D. Md. 
2005). 
208 See id. at 460. 
209 See id. at 458-64. 
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mandate . . . and thus consider regional approaches to promoting fair housing 
opportunities.”210 
Lastly, with respect to remedies, severe segregation has justified aggressive 
policy responses by both courts and local governments. Bold steps that otherwise 
might have raised legal hackles have been countenanced as the only way to 
achieve integration. The courts’ orders that hundreds of public housing units be 
built in heavily white neighborhoods in Yonkers,211 and that thousands of black 
families be given Section 8 vouchers in order to move to heavily white Chicago 
suburbs,212 are good examples of forceful judicial intervention. Both orders were 
upheld on appeal,213 even though they relied explicitly on race in an era in which 
such means were disfavored. 
At the local government level, probably the most famous case of an 
unorthodox remedy being imposed (and then sustained) is the New York City 
Housing Authority’s decision in the 1970s to limit the share of minority residents 
in a Lower East Side public housing development.214 The Authority worried that, 
without this occupancy quota, the development would become “a non-white 
‘pocket ghetto’” that would induce “white residents to take flight,” thus “leading 
eventually to non-white ghettoization of the community.”215 The Second Circuit 
approved the quota, reasoning that the Authority’s “obligation to act 
affirmatively to achieve integration” outweighed the harm of “prevent[ing] some 
members of a racial minority from residing in publicly assisted housing.”216 To 
avoid exceeding the local tipping point, that is, desegregation took priority over 
antidiscrimination. 
Given that integration is one of the FHA’s fundamental goals, it may not be 
surprising that the statute is intertwined so tightly with racial groups’ residential 
patterns. The extent of these ties, though, has not been grasped previously. At 
every stage in an FHA case—standing, liability, and remedy—the existence of 
segregation makes it markedly easier for plaintiffs to satisfy their burdens. More 
importantly, as I argue next, rising integration has the opposite effects. It causes 
each FHA element to become considerably more difficult to establish. This thesis 
already is more than conjecture, as the ensuing cases illustrate. And the problems 
for FHA claimants posed by desegregation only can be expected to intensify as 
racial separation continues to decline. 
 
                                                 
210 Id. at 463. 
211 See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1184 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding trial court 
order). 
212 See Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616, 638 (7th Cir. 1982) (approving consent decree); Gautreaux v. 
Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 672 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (same). 
213 See supra notes 211-212. 
214 See Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1128 (2d Cir. 1973) (describing actions taken 
by Authority to achieve 60% white-40% nonwhite resident makeup at development). These actions were not 
taken in response to FHA litigation; rather, they are what prompted the (unsuccessful) suit. For another New 
York City example of a racial occupancy quota being upheld where necessary to prevent tipping, see Daubner 
v. Harris, 514 F. Supp. 856, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (approving such policy at Chelsea public housing 
development). 
215 Otero, 484 F.2d at 1124. 
216 Id. at 1133-34. 
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B. Complication 
 
Start again with standing. Just as it is a cognizable injury to live in a 
neighborhood that is segregated (or segregating) because of a defendant’s 
actions, a plaintiff who lives in a stably integrated area has not been harmed. She 
has not been deprived (nor faces any risk of deprivation) of the “social and 
professional benefits” that come from interracial contact.217 For instance, the 
northern half of the Upper West Side was one of New York City’s few integrated 
communities in the 1980s.218 It was just over 60% white in this period, a level 
largely unchanged from earlier decades.219 In litigation challenging a proposed 
luxury development on FHA grounds, the court therefore held that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing. “[I]t is clear that plaintiffs have not suffered any loss of 
associational benefits. Indeed, their opportunities to derive the benefits of living 
in an integrated neighborhood have increased over the years.”220 
Similarly, Cleveland Heights is a Cleveland suburb that (unlike Parma) 
implemented several policies in the 1970s to promote integration.221 As a result, 
it became a “racially integrated community” with a population that was roughly 
75% white and 25% black.222 In a lawsuit alleging racial steering by the town, the 
court ruled that a minority plaintiff who resided in Cleveland Heights did not 
have standing. “[H]e has not lost any of the social benefits of interracial living in 
his neighborhood. Hence, he is prevented from establishing standing.”223 
Next take the disparate treatment theory of FHA liability. In the same way 
that segregated residential patterns support an inference of invidious intent, 
integrated patterns suggest the opposite conclusion. A defendant in an integrated 
area certainly could aim to discriminate or to segregate—but these motives are 
both less likely and harder to prove in the absence of racial separation. A recent 
case from Joliet, a suburb of Chicago, highlights the obstacles that integration 
presents for disparate treatment claims. Joliet is a “very diverse city,” about 53% 
white, 28% Hispanic, and 16% black as of the 2010 Census.224 In the mid-2000s, 
Joliet decided to use its eminent domain power to acquire, and then close, a large 
low-income development occupied mostly by minorities.225 Because the 
dislocated tenants were expected to remain in the city, the development’s closure 
                                                 
217 Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 111 (1979). 
218 See Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council v. City of New York, 695 F. Supp. 1531, 1542 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988) (citing Census statistics showing that “the renewal area historically has been a well integrated 
neighborhood and has become more integrated over time”). 
219 See id. 
220 Id. 
221 See Smith v. City of Cleveland Heights, 760 F.2d 720, 721 (6th Cir. 1985) (describing city’s policies of 
maintaining integration by “steering white home buyers to the Cleveland Heights housing market and black 
home buyers away from the area”). 
222 See id. 
223 Id. at 725 (Wellford, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit 
held that the plaintiff had standing because Cleveland Heights’s “steering policies stigmatize him as an inferior 
member of the community.” Id. at 722. The majority noted the plaintiff’s associational argument for standing, 
and then explicitly declined to address it. See id. at 724.  
224 City of Joliet v. Mid-City Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 2014 WL 4667254, at *23 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2014). 
225 See id. at *4-9. 
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was predicted to improve (or at least not worsen) existing integration.226 The 
court thus decided that “this circumstantial evidence . . . cannot support the 
conclusion that Joliet possesses a discriminatory intent.”227 
Likewise, University Oaks is a neighborhood of Houston that, in the 1980s, 
was “highly integrated with [a] minority population estimated at nearly 50% of 
the residents.”228 The area’s homeowners voted to renew property deeds that 
contained restrictive racial covenants entered into half a century earlier.229 In an 
FHA suit brought by the Department of Justice, the court relied on the “present 
composition of the community” to hold that the homeowners “had no intent 
whatsoever to discriminate on the basis of race.”230 The community’s status as an 
“integrated model community” offset the more negative deductions about intent 
that followed from the covenants’ extension.231 
The impact of integration on the disparate impact theory of FHA liability is 
even starker. If residential patterns are integrated and likely to remain so, then it 
is very difficult for segregation to be “create[d], increase[d], reinforce[d], or 
perpetuate[d].”232 The basic prerequisite for this kind of FHA violation—a 
practice that maintains or worsens existing segregation—is absent. Recall from 
earlier that a disparate impact typically is found when a municipality either uses 
zoning to prevent low-income developments from being built or restricts public 
housing to minority-heavy areas.233 Neither of these scenarios is plausible in the 
face of integration. 
For example, in a recent case from Fulton County, a suburban region near 
Atlanta, the plaintiffs challenged the county’s refusal to rezone property where 
they hoped to construct a low-income development.234 This property was in a 
“tract with 54% black population” that bordered another tract that was 42% 
black.235 The court denied the claim, reasoning that “[i]n the absence of the 
[proposed] development the South Fulton County area likely will remain a 
racially mixed, predominantly African-American area, just as it was 
previously.”236 Similarly, in a case from the 1990s, the plaintiffs complained 
                                                 
226 See id. at *23 (noting that “relocation of 240 [development] families . . . . cannot be reasonably 
believed to affect the overall demographics of Joliet”). 
227 Id.; see also id. at *17 (“[T]he demographic statistics presented by the parties is conclusive evidence 
that Joliet does not intend to discriminate against African–Americans . . . .”). 
228 United States v. Univ. Oaks Civic Club, 653 F. Supp. 1469, 1471 (S.D. Tex. 1987). 
229 See id. at 1472. However, the homeowners also took steps to reduce the covenants’ effects. See id. 
230 Id. at 1473. 
231 Id.; see also id. at 1475 (commenting that “a highly integrated community . . . . is hardly characteristic 
of the perpetrators of discrimination that the Fair Housing Act has focused upon”). For another example of 
integration mitigating against a finding of invidious intent, see Heights Cmty. Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 
774 F.2d 135, 143 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding that realtor lacked segregative motive when he circulated solicitation 
cards to homeowners in “transitional” neighborhood in Cleveland Heights). 
232 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a). The case law has not yet confronted practices that increase segregation, but are 
undertaken in areas that are largely integrated. When disputes involving such practices emerge, courts will have 
to decide if all segregative practices are presumptively unlawful, or only those adopted in segregated areas. 
233 See supra notes 197-204 and accompanying text. 
234 See Hallmark Devel., Inc. v. Fulton Cty., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1372-80 (N.D. Ga. 2005). 
235 Id. at 1371. 
236 Id. at 1383; see also Hallmark Devel., Inc. v. Fulton Cty., 466 F.3d 1276, 1288 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]here is no evidence that South Fulton is currently segregated and that Hallmark’s development would end 
that segregation.”). 
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about the location and volume of public housing in Islip, a suburb of New York 
City.237 Islip was integrating rapidly in this period, with the share of its black 
population living in heavily black tracts falling from 91% to 69% over a 
decade.238 This integrative trend helped convince the court that “[t]he evidence 
presented with regard to the Town’s housing policies . . . fail[s] to establish any 
segregative effect.”239 
Lastly, as to remedies, integration reduces both the need for aggressive 
measures by courts and municipalities and the likelihood that they will be upheld 
in litigation. The best evidence of reduced need is indirect. There are very few 
cases in recent years of courts granting relief on the scale of the 1980s Yonkers 
and Chicago orders, which led to thousands of black families moving to white 
areas at public expense.240 There also are “virtually no new [public housing 
quotas] in this period and thus litigation involving such programs has ceased.”241 
The only reason for these quotas was to prevent neighborhoods from tipping.242 
As the danger of tipping has receded, so has the impetus to adopt these policies. 
The legal vulnerability of forceful remedies is illustrated nicely, in the 
context of a court order, by a Dallas case from the 1990s. Like the Yonkers and 
Chicago courts, the Dallas court held that the local housing authority had 
perpetuated segregation by restricting public housing to minority-heavy areas.243 
Also like those courts, it then instructed the authority to build thousands of new 
public housing units in white neighborhoods.244 But on appeal, this order was 
deemed a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Because Dallas was 
desegregating, thanks in part to the “relative success of [the authority] in moving 
blacks into white areas via its Section 8 program,” the “district court’s race-
conscious site selection criterion” was not “necessary to remedy the effects of 
past discrimination.”245 
                                                 
237 See Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Islip, 1996 WL 75282, at *2-9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1996). 
238 See id. at *1. 
239 Id. at *12. The court also noted that some of the public housing erected by Islip had an integrative 
effect. See id. at *12-13. Two more examples of disparate impact claims failing in integrated areas come from 
the Upper West Side of New York City. See Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council v. City of New York, 695 F. 
Supp. 1531, 1542 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (rejecting disparate impact claim against proposed luxury development); 
Trinity Episcopal Sch. Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975) (same against proposed low-income development). And Artisan/American Corp. v. 
City of Alvin, 588 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 2009), is a case remarkably similar to Hallmark, with the court rejecting a 
disparate impact challenge to a city’s denial of a permit for a low-income development due to lack of “evidence 
that minorities lived in particular areas of town, or that the project would exacerbate such a trend, if it existed.” 
Id. at 299 n.20. 
240 See supra notes 211-213 and accompanying text. As discussed below, one similarly aggressive court 
order, in Dallas in the 1990s, was declared unlawful on appeal. See infra notes 243-245 and accompanying text.  
241 SCHWEMM, supra note 6, at § 11A:2. 
242 See Rodney A. Smolla, In Pursuit of Racial Utopias: Fair Housing, Quotas, and Goals in the 1980s, 58 
S. CAL. L. REV. 947, 989 (1985) (“The only reason that racial occupancy controls are needed is that without 
them too many whites . . . find themselves overwhelmed by fear and bias when faced with . . . substantial 
numbers of black neighbors.”). 
243 See Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973, 976 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The history of public housing in 
Dallas is a sordid tale of overt and covert racial discrimination and segregation.”). 
244 See id. at 977 (describing court order). 
245 Id. at 984; see also id. (noting that “number of Section 8 black families living in predominantly white 
areas increased by . . . 27%” in two-year period). 
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Analogously, courts in the 1980s struck down racial occupancy quotas used 
by public housing developments in Charlottesville, New York City, and 
Pittsburgh.246 The problem with all of these policies was the same. In areas that 
were integrating, slowly but surely, there was insufficient evidence that the 
quotas were necessary to prevent tipping. As the court observed in the Pittsburgh 
case, the development had remained “located in an integrated section” even as 
the “percentage of minority occupancy in the [development] had increased.”247 
The housing authority thus was unable to prove that “existing integration . . . 
would be destroyed absent a restriction on the number of minorities permitted to 
reside in public housing.”248 
But while it is clear that integration complicates several aspects of FHA 
doctrine, two caveats should be noted here. First, integration has little bearing on 
claims that are based on discrimination rather than segregation. It is perfectly 
possible for landlords, realtors, housing authorities, and other parties to 
discriminate in housing transactions even as residential patterns become less 
racially separated.249 And second, the case for the disruptive effects of integration 
is stronger in theory than in practice (at least to date). Compared to the many 
instances in which segregation has facilitated the imposition of liability and 
potent remedies, the number of suits in which integration has had the opposite 
consequences remains modest.250 
How come? The most likely explanation is that the national decline in 
segregation is too recent (and too geographically uneven) to have manifested 
itself fully in the FHA case law. Until not long ago (and to this day in several 
metropolitan areas), segregation was not low enough to be a hindrance rather 
than a boon for plaintiffs. Another possibility is that FHA suits are filed at higher 
rates in segregated areas than in integrated ones. Self-selection of this sort could 
cause the courts’ perception of American residential patterns to diverge from the 
empirical reality. 
But whatever the reason for the relatively low volume of FHA cases 
grappling with desegregation, the key points here are conceptual and prospective. 
Desegregation does make it harder for plaintiffs to show standing, to establish 
liability, and to win sweeping remedies. And these obstacles are likely to loom 
larger in the future, as the country continues to integrate. Below, I discuss what 
these points mean for the FHA as a whole. My view is that they may prompt the 
                                                 
246 See United States v. Charlottesville Redev. & Hous. Auth’y, 718 F. Supp. 461, 471 (W.D. Va. 1989) 
(invalidating Charlottesville quota on FHA grounds); United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 660 F. Supp. 668, 
679 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (invalidating New York City quota on FHA grounds); Burney v. Hous. Auth’y of Beaver 
Cty., 551 F. Supp. 746, 767, 770 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (invaliding Pittsburgh quota on constitutional and FHA 
grounds). 
247 Burney, 551 F. Supp. at 766 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
248 Id. at 765; see also Charlottesville, 718 F. Supp. at 466 n.8 (“CRHA has not demonstrated that a 
[tipping] demographic similar to the situation in Otero exists in the instant matter.”); Starrett City, 660 F. Supp. 
at 678 (noting “wide elasticity of [tipping], which ranged ‘from a low of 1% black to a high of 60% black’”). 
249 But see Galster, supra note 111, at 113 (finding that volume of housing discrimination and segregation 
are linked, and thus implying that there may be less discrimination if segregation is lower). 
250 Notably, I am unaware of any affirmative furtherance claims under 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) that have 
failed on the ground that desegregating residential patterns show that HUD has pursued integration with 
sufficient vigor. 
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statute’s reorientation from desegregation to antidiscrimination—and that this 
shift in focus would be, for the most part, desirable. 
 
C. Conciliation 
 
I begin on the bright side. If the elements of a cause of action aimed at 
bringing about “integrated and balanced living patterns”251 are now trickier to 
prove—because these patterns are now more prevalent—then congratulations are 
in order for a significant civil rights victory. The growing problems faced by 
certain FHA plaintiffs are a sign that one of the statute’s key objectives, 
desegregation, is closer to being achieved. Diminished activity, heading 
eventually toward dormancy, is exactly what we should want for provisions 
combating an evil that gradually is fading from the American residential 
landscape.  
This optimism extends to the FHA’s antidiscrimination project. As discussed 
earlier, discrimination is a major driver of segregation because it can prevent 
minorities from being able to live in their preferred neighborhoods.252 The 
available evidence also indicates that discrimination is decreasing, and so helping 
to propel the decline in segregation.253 Under these conditions, we might expect 
(and applaud) a lower frequency of, and success rate for, housing discrimination 
claims. And indeed, this seems to be what is happening. Michael Schill reports 
that “blatant forms of discrimination are becoming less common” in complaints 
filed with HUD.254 Likewise, Stacy Seicshnaydre finds that plaintiffs’ odds of 
winning FHA appeals fell from 100% in the 1970s to 47% in the 1980s, 13% in 
the 1990s, and only 8% in the 2000s.255 This trend could reflect changing judicial 
attitudes, but it also could signify that the FHA’s other bête noire is becoming 
rarer too.256 
However, there remain reasons for wariness even in light of this encouraging 
picture. With respect to the FHA’s desegregative side, it would not be impossible 
for segregation levels to rise in coming years, say if another economic crisis were 
to destabilize integrating neighborhoods.257 This sort of shock would raise the 
profile of doctrinal elements linked to segregation and make them easier for 
                                                 
251 Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
252 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
253 See supra notes 101-113 and accompanying text. 
254 Michael H. Schill, Implementing the Federal Fair Housing Act: The Adjudication of Complaints, in 
FRAGILE RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES, supra note 75, at 143, 152. 
255 See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty 
Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 393 (2013) (surveying 
appellate FHA cases involving disparate impact claims). 
256 See Richard H. Sander, Housing Segregation and Housing Integration: The Diverging Paths of Urban 
America, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 977, 1009 (1998) (also concluding that FHA “was, at least, partly successful in 
its principal goal of attacking market discrimination”). 
257 See supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text (discussing how foreclosure crisis of late 2000s 
modestly increased segregation). 
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plaintiffs to establish.258 In addition, even in a generally integrating society, 
specific actions may well be taken with segregative intent or have a segregative 
effect. The law should remain watchful for these actions, not overlooking them 
due to the overall rise in integration.  
The need for vigilance is even greater with respect to the FHA’s 
antidiscrimination half. Housing discrimination may be declining, and it may no 
longer be the main determinant of racial groups’ residential patterns, but it still 
occurs far too often. Notably, the most recent HUD survey concluded that about 
9% of black renters and 13% of black homebuyers are told about fewer available 
units than their white peers.259 Roughly 3% of black renters and 9% of black 
homebuyers also are shown fewer units.260 These rates are substantially lower 
than in earlier eras, but they still imply that hundreds of thousands of FHA 
violations take place each year.261 The struggle against discrimination clearly has 
not yet been won. 
This analysis suggests that the FHA may operate somewhat differently in the 
future than it has to date. Historically, many landmark cases involved 
desegregation in some capacity. The Supreme Court’s leading encounters with 
the statute addressed standing in segregated areas and disparate impact claims 
based on the furtherance of segregation.262 In the lower courts too, “the most 
common type” of disparate impact decision dealt with “exclusionary zoning . . . 
challenged on the ground that it perpetuates housing segregation.”263 By contrast, 
antidiscrimination cases, while abundant, were relatively small-bore.264 They 
implicated fewer parties, had less dramatic consequences, and did not set off the 
same judicial fireworks.265 
Going forward, though, antidiscrimination is likely to be where the action is. 
In a more integrated environment, segregation should not be as grave of a 
concern, and there should not be as much for the FHA’s desegregative provisions 
to do. These provisions still should have some utility, serving as a prophylactic in 
case segregation rises again as well as a weapon against lingering segregative 
                                                 
258 Cf. John P. Relman, Foreclosures, Integration, and the Future of the Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 
629, 638-47 (2008) (explaining how FHA could be used to challenge reverse redlining practices that led to high 
foreclosure rates in minority-heavy areas in late 2000s). 
259 See TURNER ET AL., supra note 15, at xiv-xvi. 
260 See id. 
261 See id. at 68 (showing decline in housing discrimination since 1977); see also SCHWEMM, supra note 6, 
at § 11A:1 (noting that “housing providers—particularly landlords—continue to violate [FHA] at an astonishing 
rate”); Robert B. Avery et al., New Information Reported Under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending 
Enforcement, 2005 FED. RESERVE BULLETIN 344, 376, 379 (finding that blacks are denied housing loans at 
higher rates than whites, and given worse loan terms, even controlling for array of non-racial factors). 
262 See Inclusive Communities, 2015 WL 2473449, at *13; Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 
363, 376, 381 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-11 (1979); Trafficante v. 
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972). 
263 SCHWEMM, supra note 6, at § 10:5. 
264 See id. at § 10:2 (noting frequency of these cases); see also id. at § 13:2 (describing typical 
antidiscrimination claims). 
265 See Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act, 54 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
199, 262 (1978) (characterizing “the ‘big’ private housing case” as one aimed at achieving “the congressional 
goal of an open, integrated society”). But see Shanna L. Smith, the National Fair Housing Alliance at Work, in 
RESIDENTIAL APARTHEID: THE AMERICAN LEGACY 237, 247-48 (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 1994) (listing 
major antidiscrimination victories under FHA). 
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practices. But their potency should be lower than in previous periods. On the 
other hand, even in an integrating society, housing discrimination probably will 
persist at levels necessitating substantial litigation. Landlords will continue 
refusing to rent to minorities, realtors will keep steering homebuyers to different 
neighborhoods, and so on. The resulting antidiscrimination suits still may be 
small-bore, at least compared to the earlier battles over desegregation. But odds 
are they will be, if not the only game in town, at least the most important one.266 
On balance, I find appealing this account of how the FHA eventually might 
function. Less would be asked of the statute, especially in terms of desegregation. 
But less would be needed, given the ongoing declines in both racial separation 
and discrimination. Instead of fighting endlessly in the trenches, the law might 
evolve into a sort of tactical reserve, intervening at times to preserve existing 
gains and quell new uprisings. This is not a heroic vision, but we are gradually 
moving toward an America that may not require a heroic FHA. 
 
III. VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
 
The next civil rights statute I address is the Voting Rights Act—in particular, 
its core operative provision, Section 2, which bans racial vote dilution.267 The 
VRA does not have as obvious a relationship as the FHA with racial groups’ 
residential patterns. Why, after all, should the fate of a vote dilution claim hinge 
on the segregation of a minority population? The answer cannot be found in the 
law itself. It lies, instead, in the doctrine the courts have devised to apply the 
VRA. The Supreme Court has held that there can be liability only if a minority 
group is geographically compact—that is, segregated. The Court also has 
required proof of racial polarization in voting. Polarization is conceptually 
distinct from segregation, but as a methodological matter, it is easier to show 
under segregated conditions. And for their part, the lower courts have added 
racial separation to the list of factors that may be considered at the totality-of-
circumstances stage of the analysis. 
As in the FHA case, integration interferes with all of these elements. By 
definition, an integrated minority group is not geographically compact, and so 
cannot prevail in a VRA challenge. Polarization also may exist in an integrated 
area, but the techniques typically used to estimate it are unreliable in this setting. 
At the totality stage too, integration weighs against a finding of liability. But 
unlike in the FHA case, these implications are cause for concern, not 
contentment. One of the VRA’s goals is minority representation, and this aim is 
directly threatened by desegregation. Fortunately, the danger here is doctrinal 
rather than statutory, and so could be dispelled by judicial rather than legislative 
action. To enable the VRA to play its proper role, the courts could eliminate the 
                                                 
266 I reiterate my earlier point that antidiscrimination suits under the FHA include both disparate 
treatment and disparate impact claims. See supra note 173. 
267 See 52 U.S.C. § 10301. The VRA’s other key component, Section 5, effectively was nullified in Shelby 
Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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compactness requirement, permit polarization to be shown using new methods, 
and authorize remedies other than single-member districts. 
 
 
 
A. Connection 
 
Enacted in 1965 and substantially amended in 1982, Section 2 of the VRA 
now prohibits what is known as racial vote dilution: state action, short of outright 
disenfranchisement, that makes it more difficult for minority voters to elect their 
preferred candidates.268 Specifically, the provision forbids any “practice[] or 
procedure . . . which results in a[n] . . . abridgement of the right . . . to vote on 
account of race or color.”269 A violation is established if, “based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that . . . members [of a minority group] have less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate . . . to elect representatives of 
their choice.”270 Section 2 also states that the “extent to which members of a 
protected class have been elected to office . . . is one circumstance which may be 
considered.”271 
A careful reader may notice that the statutory text does not mention 
compactness, polarization, or racial separation. This observation is accurate. 
These concepts are part of Section 2 law not because they are recognized by the 
provision itself, but rather because courts have inserted them into the doctrine. 
This insertion occurred most famously in the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision, 
Thornburg v. Gingles, its first interpreting the amended statute.272 The Court held 
that there are three “necessary preconditions” for liability in vote dilution suits.273 
First, the “minority group must be . . . sufficiently large and geographically 
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.”274 Second, the 
group must be “politically cohesive.”275 And third, the “white majority [must] 
vote[] sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s 
preferred candidate.”276 If these criteria are met, the final analytical step is a 
                                                 
268 Section 2 also prohibits outright disenfranchisement. See id. § 10301(a) (banning “denial . . . of the 
right . . . to vote on account of race or color”); id. § 10301(b) (provision is violated if minority “members have 
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process”); see also Nicholas 
O. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 55, 106-18 (discussing application of 
Section 2 and Section 5 of VRA to vote denial claims). Unlike vote dilution, vote denial is not connected to 
racial groups’ residential patterns, and so I do not discuss it further. 
269 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). 
270 Id. § 10301(b). 
271 Id. 
272 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see also Daniel P. Tokaji, Realizing the Right to Vote: The Story of Thornburg v. 
Gingles 27 (Aug. 21, 2015) (“[W]hat is perhaps most surprising about the backstory to Gingles is that its now-
canonical test for vote dilution did not appear in any of the briefs, the oral argument, nor even in the first draft 
of Justice Brennan’s opinion . . . .”). 
273 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. at 51. 
276 Id. 
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totality-of-circumstances inquiry focused on the nine factors identified by the 
Senate report that accompanied Section 2’s revision in 1982.277 
Of these elements, the one that is linked most directly to racial groups’ 
residential patterns is Gingles’s first prong, geographic compactness. To require a 
group to be geographically compact before liability may be imposed, in essence, 
is to require it to be residentially segregated. That the Court conceived of 
compactness and segregation as largely synonymous is clear from its decision. At 
various points, it referred to the minority voters who would be able to win vote 
dilution claims as “geographically insular” and “sufficiently concentrated.”278 It 
also contrasted these voters with ones “spread evenly throughout a multimember 
district” and “substantially integrated throughout the jurisdiction,” who would 
not be able to prevail.279 Commentators have pointed out the convergence 
between compactness and segregation as well. In Dana Carstarphen’s words, “the 
Court has made residential segregation a prerequisite to the protection of rights 
established by the Voting Rights Act.”280 
Why did the Court predicate Section 2 liability on something as seemingly 
unrelated as segregation? The explanation lies in the only remedy the Court 
contemplated for violations of the provision: the creation of single-member 
districts. If a minority group is segregated, a district easily can be drawn around 
it, and the group then can elect its preferred candidate as long as Gingles’s other 
criteria (sufficient size and racial polarization) are met.281 Conversely, if a group 
is residentially integrated, it becomes very difficult for a district to capture 
enough of its members to enable them to elect the candidate of their choice. To 
do so (where it is possible at all), a district must assume a highly irregular shape, 
connecting whatever local concentrations of the group happen to occur. As the 
Court put it, if a group is not segregated, “as would be the case in a substantially 
integrated [area],” then district lines “cannot be responsible for minority voters’ 
inability to elect [their preferred] candidates.”282 
                                                 
277 See id. at 36-37 (citing Senate factors). 
278 Id. at 49, 50 n.17, 64, 80 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
279 Id. at 50 n.17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
280 Dana R. Carstarphen, The Single Transferable Vote: Achieving the Goals of Section 2 Without 
Sacrificing the Integration Ideal, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 406 (1991); see also, e.g., Lani Guinier, 
Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 
1589, 1623 (1993); Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities Policy, 
1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 87 (“The first [Gingles] element focuses on geographic segregation.”). 
Many cases also have held that residentially segregated groups satisfy Gingles’s geographic compactness 
requirement. See, e.g., Askew v. City of Rome, 127 F.3d 1355, 1371 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that “[n]early 
three quarters of Rome’s black population . . . lives in majority black census blocks”); Large v. Fremont Cty., 
709 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1191 (D. Wyo. 2010) (involving Native American population of which “vast majority . . . 
resides on the Reservation” and “is concentrated in [three] communities”); King v. State Bd. of Elec., 979 F. 
Supp. 619, 625 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (observing “clustering of Hispanics into two densely populated enclaves” in 
Chicago). I do not discuss these cases in the main text because the point about compactness and segregation 
being overlapping concepts seems so clear. 
281 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 769, 844 (2013) 
(noting that single-member districts “can benefit only minority groups that are large and geographically 
dense”).  
282 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50; see also id. at 50 n.17 (“The single-member district is generally the 
appropriate standard against which to measure minority group potential to elect . . . .”). The compactness 
requirement also might be justified on the ground that a segregated minority group is more likely to be the 
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Importantly, the Court was correct that segregation can increase minority 
representation if single-member districts are used.283 Two recent studies examine 
how a state’s index of dissimilarity (calculated for minorities and non-minorities, 
and for counties within the state) is related to its number of congressional 
majority-minority districts.284 Both studies find that, even controlling for 
minority population size, partisan control, and redistricting criteria, more 
segregated states tend to have more majority-minority districts.285 In fact, as the 
dissimilarity index varies from its lowest to its highest level, states form about 
2.5 more districts in which minorities can elect the candidate of their choice.286 
These results confirm that a compactness requirement is reasonable as long as 
Section 2 remedies are restricted to single-member districts. 
Turning next to Gingles’s second and third prongs,287 they are tied 
methodologically rather than substantively to segregation. Minority political 
cohesion (the second prong) and white bloc voting (the third one) boil down to a 
single concept: racial polarization in voting.288 If most minorities support one 
candidate, and most whites back her opponent, then voting is racially polarized 
(and vice versa). Polarization, in turn, has no inherent connection to 
segregation.289 Racial groups can prefer different candidates while living near 
one another, or the same candidate while living apart.290 But both of the 
techniques typically used to measure polarization rely on segregated residential 
patterns. Segregation is what makes these techniques feasible.  
The simpler method to calculate polarization is homogeneous precinct 
analysis.291 First, election precincts that are highly (usually over 90%) racially 
homogeneous are identified.292 Second, the results of elections involving a 
                                                                                                                         
victim of discrimination than an integrated one—and thus in greater need of judicial protection. But this is not 
the Court’s own explanation for the requirement; the relationship between segregation and discrimination is far 
from ironclad; and polarization (the focus of Gingles’s next two steps) seems a better proxy for discrimination 
than segregation.  
283 Though segregation does not necessarily increase minority representation. Clusters of minority voters 
also can be split by district lines, rendering the voters unable to elect their preferred candidates. 
284 See Jason Barabas & Jennifer Jerit, Redistricting Principles and Racial Representation, 4 STATE POL. 
& POL’Y Q. 415, 423 (2004); Carl E. Klarner, Redistricting Principles and Racial Representation: A Re-
Analysis, 7 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 298, 299 (2007). By law, all congressional districts are represented by 
single members. See 2 U.S.C. § 2c. 
285 See id. Klarner also found that more segregated states tend to have higher shares of majority-minority 
districts. See Klarner, supra note 284, at 299. 
286 This is because the dissimilarity index varies from 0.33 to 0.93 and its regression coefficient is 4.41. 
See Barabas & Jerit, supra note 284, at 421, 423; Klarner, supra note 284, at 299. 
287 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51. 
288 See BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 
82 (1992) (observing that polarization is “foundation for two of the three prongs of the Gingles test”). 
289 Unlike geographic compactness, the polarization requirement does not stem from an assumption that 
single-member districts are the only available remedy. Polarization is necessary for there to be racial vote 
dilution in the first place. If a minority group is not politically cohesive, then there is no minority-preferred 
candidate. Similarly, if there is no white bloc voting, then there is no enduring obstacle to the election of the 
minority’s candidate of choice. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. 
290 But see Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial 
Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 203 (1989) (speculating that polarization might be 
lower in integrated areas). In future work, I plan to assess empirically the polarization-segregation relationship. 
291 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 52, 53 n.20 (referring to “extreme case analysis” as “standard in the literature 
for the analysis of racially polarized voting”). 
292 See Greiner, supra note 30, at 464 (also referring to 90% cutoff). 
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minority candidate of choice are compiled for these precincts. And third, these 
results are used to determine the extent of minority political cohesion and white 
bloc voting.293 As should be obvious, all of these steps hinge on the presence of 
racially homogeneous precincts—that is, segregation.294 Only if there exist 
precincts at least 90% of whose voters belong to the same race can the analysis 
begin. As Bernard Grofman and his coauthors comment, “if there are precincts 
that are overwhelmingly . . . composed of members of the same race, one can be 
extremely confident of the voting behavior of members of that group.”295 
The more advanced approach to estimating polarization is ecological 
regression (of which there exist still more sophisticated variants, such as King’s 
ecological inference).296 All precincts, not only racially homogeneous ones, are 
used by this technique. The share of the vote received by the minority-preferred 
candidate in each precinct then is regressed on each precinct’s minority 
population share. The fit of this regression indicates how well electoral 
preferences are explained by race, while the 0% and 100% intercepts denote the 
levels of minority political cohesion and white bloc voting.  
Again, this procedure works best when most voters in most precincts belong 
to the same race. Under these conditions, impossible conclusions (for instance, 
that 110% of black voters support the black candidate of choice) are rare.297 The 
impact of the ecological fallacy, which points out that individuals’ preferences 
cannot be ascertained using group-level data, is reduced too.298 The procedure 
also is most tenable when voters belong to precisely two races. Then the 
proportions that are inputted into the model do not hide the presence of other 
racial groups, and valuable information about voting and demography is not 
sacrificed.299 Ecological regression thus depends on not only a segregated 
society, but also a biracial one.300 
Lastly, recall that Gingles’s final step is a totality-of-circumstances inquiry in 
which the nine Senate factors take center stage.301 Racial separation is not one of 
these factors, but numerous lower courts nevertheless have added it to the list of 
                                                 
293 For example, if a precinct is 95% black and 5% white, and a minority candidate of choice wins the 
precinct by a margin of 85% to 15%, then the candidate must have won between 84% and 89% of the black 
vote. This is a very narrow (and thus very useful) range of possible minority cohesion scores. 
294 Strictly speaking, what is necessary here is a high score on the isolation index, indicating that most 
minority members live in minority-heavy neighborhoods. 
295 GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 288, at 85; see also Greiner, supra note 30, at 464 (“[I]f one racial group 
dominates . . . then the observed vote totals in that precinct can be safely attributed to this racial group alone . . . 
.”). 
296 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 52-53 & n.20 (also referring to “bivariate ecological regression analysis” as 
“standard in the literature for the analysis of racially polarized voting”); see also GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 
288, at 82-105; GARY KING, A SOLUTION TO THE ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE PROBLEM (1997). 
297 See Greiner, supra note 30, at 464 (“Without the bounds to constrain the numbers, impossible results 
can (and often do) occur.”). 
298 See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the VRA After Shelby 
County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 14) (commenting that ecological regression 
“works reasonably well when . . . precincts are racially homogenous”). 
299 See Greiner, supra note 28, at 157 (“[E]cological regression is especially problematic when applied to 
precinct tables of size larger than two by two.”); Greiner, supra note 30, at 465-67. 
300 For an exhaustive list of cases relying on both homogeneous precinct analysis and ecological 
regression, generally under segregated conditions, see Greiner, supra note 28, at 155-57. 
301 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36-37. 
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items that should be considered.302 For example, one court observed that South 
Carolina’s “Charleston County remains to a large extent separated along racial 
lines.”303 The area’s segregation weighed in favor of Section 2 liability because it 
“hinder[ed] the ability of African-American candidates to solicit the votes of 
white voters.”304 Similarly, another court noted the high black-white dissimilarity 
index of Euclid, Ohio.305 Here too, “racial separation in Euclid’s housing . . . 
serve[d] to hamper the ability of African–American candidates to fully engage 
the predominately white electorate.”306 
To be sure, not all of Section 2 revolves around segregation. Gingles’s first 
prong also implicates the size of the minority population and the shape of the 
district that could be drawn around it.307 As a substantive matter, the second and 
third prongs involve racial groups’ electoral preferences, not their residential 
patterns.308 And the nine Senate factors do not even refer to racial separation 
(though they do emphasize one of its key causes, discrimination).309 Still, it 
seems undeniable that segregation plays a substantial (if not exclusive) role at 
each Section 2 stage. Next, I show how these functions are compromised by 
rising integration. Both in theory and in practice, integrated minority groups face 
serious obstacles in winning vote dilution challenges. 
 
B. Complication 
 
The problems posed by integration are clearest with respect to Gingles’s first 
prong. Minority voters who are residentially integrated are the very opposite of a 
geographically compact group. In the Court’s terminology, they are diffuse rather 
than “insular,” dilute rather than “concentrated.”310 Accordingly, they cannot 
prevail under Section 2 because they fail one of the Court’s “necessary 
preconditions” for liability.311 As Richard Briffault puts it, “Where minorities are 
residentially scattered . . . it [is] difficult to create [the] majority-minority 
districts” assumed by Gingles to be the only available remedy for vote dilution.312 
The Court confronted “largely integrated communities” of Houston-area 
blacks and Hispanics in an important 1996 case.313 The plaintiffs argued that 
Section 2 required “two of the three least regular districts in the country” to be 
                                                 
302 See Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 706 (2006) (noting this trend). 
303 United States v. Charleston Cty., 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, 292 (D.S.C. 2003). 
304 Id. 
305 See United States v. City of Euclid, 580 F. Supp. 2d 584, 606 (N.D. Ohio 2008). 
306 Id. at 613. 
307 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986). 
308 See id. at 51. 
309 See id. at 36-37 (factors include “any history of official discrimination” and “extent to which members 
of the minority group . . . bear the effects of discrimination”). 
310 Id. at 49, 50 n.17, 64, 80 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
311 Id. at 50. 
312 Richard Briffault, Lani Guinier and the Dilemmas of American Democracy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 418, 
430 (1995); see also Carstarphen, supra note 280, at 410 (“Gingles makes it difficult for residentially dispersed 
minorities to obtain a remedy for vote dilution . . . .”); Karlan, supra note 280, at 89. 
313 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1033 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
43                                             Desegregating America 
 
 
 
constructed, one with a black majority and the other with a Hispanic majority.314 
The Court rejected this claim, declaring, “If, because of the dispersion of the 
minority population, a reasonably compact majority-minority district cannot be 
created, § 2 does not require a majority-minority district.”315 In the lower courts, 
a notable case of an integrated group failing to satisfy Gingles’s first prong arose 
in Louisiana in the 1980s. Blacks in Jefferson Parish were “dispersed widely” 
with small black clusters scattered throughout the region.316 The only district that 
could enclose a black majority “contain[ed] no less than 35 sides” and crossed 
the “major natural boundary” of the Mississippi River.317 The court therefore held 
that the black population was not “sufficiently compact” and that the plaintiffs’ 
proposed district was not “an acceptable remedy to the vote dilution.”318 
Moreover, not only can integrated minority voters not comply with Gingles’s 
first prong, but if a district nevertheless is drawn around them, it is likely to be 
unconstitutional. Under the Court’s racial gerrymandering doctrine, a district is 
unlawful if “race was the predominant factor motivating” the district’s 
formation.319 Race often has been found to be the predominant motive where 
scattered minority voters were corralled within the same odd-looking district. For 
instance, the Court invalidated the Houston-area districts noted above, in part 
because they “connect[ed] dispersed minority populations” and “capture[d] 
pockets of Hispanic residents.”320 Similarly, in another landmark 1996 case, the 
Court struck down an elongated North Carolina district that enclosed the 
“relatively dispersed” black population in the state’s center.321 In the Court’s 
view, a district including “individuals who belong to the same race, but who are 
otherwise widely separated by geographical . . . boundaries . . . bears an 
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid.”322 
                                                 
314 See id. at 973 (plurality opinion). 
315 Id. at 980. 
316 E. Jefferson Coalition for Leadership & Dev. v. Jefferson Parish, 691 F. Supp. 991, 1006-07 (E.D. La. 
1988). 
317 See id. at 1007. 
318 Id. For additional examples of integrated minority groups failing to comply with Gingles’s geographic 
compactness requirement, see Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 916 (1996) (Shaw II) (“No one looking at District 12 
could reasonably suggest that the district contains a ‘geographically compact’ population of any race.”); and 
Potter v. Wash. Cty., 653 F. Supp. 121, 129 (N.D. Fla. 1986) (finding no geographic compactness where black 
population was “dispersed throughout Washington County”). 
It also is worth noting that residential integration is not the only geographic scenario that can prevent 
Gingles’s first prong from being satisfied. Several cases have held that where minorities live in numerous 
separate communities—even segregated ones—they do not form a compact population required by Section 2 to 
be placed into the same district. See, e.g., Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 2004) (involving 
proposed district with “two areas of highly-concentrated African-American population . . . linked together by a 
narrow corridor”); Johnson v. Mortham, 926 F. Supp. 1460, 1471-72 (N.D. Fla. 1996); Terrazas v. Clements, 
581 F. Supp. 1329, 1357 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (“[T]he district lines merely fail to string together dispersed pockets 
of Hispanic population . . . .”). 
319 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). 
320 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 966, 975 (1996) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
321 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 634 (1993) (Shaw I); see also Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 918 (invalidating this 
district). 
322 Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647. The converse of this proposition is true as well: Districts enclosing segregated 
minority populations are unlikely to be unconstitutional, because they usually can be justified on non-racial 
grounds such as compactness and respect for communities of interest. See, e.g., Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 
U.S. 567, 581 (1997) (upholding Tampa Bay district that “comprise[d] a predominantly urban, low-income 
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Next, with respect to Gingles’s second and third prongs, integration presents 
technical rather than substantive hurdles. If there are few racially homogeneous 
precincts in an area, analyses requiring such precincts can be conducted only 
with difficulty. Reliable inferences about racial groups’ electoral preferences 
cannot be drawn from precincts with diverse populations.323 Likewise, ecological 
regression is less accurate when minorities and whites live in more integrated 
patterns. The confidence bounds of the method’s estimates increase, impossible 
results are more common, and the impact of contestable assumptions grows.324 
As James Greiner explains, “current circumstances, particularly an increasingly 
melting-pot United States polity, now challenge these techniques [for measuring 
polarization] in new ways.”325 
These concerns are more than merely academic. In a 1980s case from 
California, there was a “dispersion of Hispanics and blacks throughout the City 
of Pomona.”326 As a result, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ estimates of minority 
political cohesion and white bloc voting. “Their homogenous precincts analysis 
is inappropriate because, due to the dispersion of minorities . . . there are no 
homogenous precincts that are 90 to 100% of one race.”327 Similarly, in a recent 
case from Alabama, Hispanics and Native Americans were substantially 
integrated throughout the state. Here too, the court declined to credit the 
plaintiffs’ allegations about polarization because there was an “insufficient 
concentration of Native Americans or Hispanics . . . for ecological regression 
analysis.”328 
Lastly, just as the presence of racial separation may weigh in favor of 
liability at the totality-of-circumstances stage, its absence may point in the 
opposite direction. In a striking 2000s case from Colorado, the court found that 
all of the Gingles factors likely were satisfied.329 The court nevertheless upheld 
the at-large election of Alamosa County’s commissioners, in part because of the 
                                                                                                                         
population”); Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 646 (“[W]hen members of a racial group live together in one community, a 
reapportionment plan that concentrates . . . the group in one district . . . may reflect wholly legitimate 
purposes.”). 
323 See GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 288, at 89 (“[I]t may not always be possible to use [homogeneous 
precinct analysis] because of the absence of sufficiently homogeneous precincts.”); Greiner, supra note 28, at 
463-64. 
324 See Greiner, supra note 28, at 464-68; see also GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 288, at 104 (noting that 
“situations . . . in which federal courts have failed to find the results of [polarization] methods to be reliable” 
include those where “minority populations were heavily intermingled”); Elmendorf & Spencer, supra note 298 
(manuscript at 14) (“[A]s neighborhoods become less homogeneous, the amount of information about racial 
voting patterns in the precinct-level data becomes very sparse.”). 
325 Greiner, supra note 28, at 462. 
326 Romero v. City of Pomona, 665 F. Supp. 853, 859 (C.D. Cal. 1987). 
327 Id. at 866. For another example of a court rejecting homogeneous precinct analysis, see Rollins v. Fort 
Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 89 F.3d 1205, 1215 n.17 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[P]laintiffs’ extreme case analyses . . . were 
unreliable because they did not involve precincts containing populations with a particular race comprising 
ninety percent of the precinct.”). 
328 Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Ala., 989 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1270 (M.D. Ala. 2013), vac’d, 135 S. Ct. 1257 
(2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). For another example of a court rejecting ecological regression, see 
Nixon v. Kent Cty., 790 F. Supp. 738, 747 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (“[A] lack of substantial Hispanic concentration 
in Kent County precludes . . . bivariate ecological regression . . . .”). 
329 United States v. Alamosa Cty., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1033 (D. Colo. 2004). 
45                                             Desegregating America 
 
 
 
“extensive integration and association among Hispanic and Anglo residents.”330 
The court observed that “Hispanic residents now live, work, and own businesses 
both north and south of the [old] demarcation line,” and that “Hispanic residents . 
. . are not as geographically and socially isolated.”331 This intermingling 
precluded Section 2 liability, according to the court, because it showed that racial 
discrimination was no longer prevalent in the County.332 
As with the FHA, these examples of Section 2 claims being undercut by 
integration are rarer than the reverse scenario—namely, Section 2 claims being 
bolstered by segregation.333 As before, the relative dearth of the former cases 
probably is attributable to the recency of America’s desegregative trend, as well 
as strategic decisions by plaintiffs to file suit in areas that remain segregated.334 
And again, the key points for present purposes are that integration does 
complicate each Section 2 element, and that these problems are likely to worsen 
as the country desegregates further. Below, I discuss the operation of Section 2 
under more integrated conditions. I explain how the doctrine construing the 
provision could be amended to allow it to continue promoting minority 
representation. 
 
C. Conciliation 
 
I was mostly sanguine earlier about the FHA’s future role for one simple 
reason: The statute aims to bring about “integrated and balanced living 
patterns.”335 Since residential segregation has been falling and probably will keep 
falling, the law is progressing toward the achievement of one of its core 
objectives. Unfortunately, such optimism is not in order for Section 2. Integration 
is not one of Section 2’s goals. But minority representation is one of them, and 
for all of the reasons discussed above, it is imperiled by desegregation. Lawsuits 
making possible the election of minority-preferred candidates become ever 
harder to win as minority voters grow ever more dispersed.   
That Section 2 seeks (among other things) to improve minority 
representation is clear from the statutory text itself. The provision emphasizes 
minority voters’ “opportunity . . . to elect representatives of their choice.”336 It 
also provides that the “extent to which members of a protected class have been 
elected to office . . . is one circumstance which may be considered.”337 The 
legislative history confirms this purpose. One of the Senate factors that courts 
evaluate at Gingles’s totality-of-circumstances stage is the “extent to which 
                                                 
330 Id. at 1020. 
331 Id. at 1020, 1035. 
332 See id. at 1038. 
333 See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
334 See id. 
335 Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also supra Part II.C. 
336 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). 
337 Id. Representatives of minorities’ choice are not necessarily identical to representatives who are 
minority members themselves. The former term refers to politicians preferred by minority voters, while the 
latter denotes politicians of a particular race, regardless of the support they enjoy from minority voters. 
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members of the minority group have been elected to public office.”338 The 1982 
Senate report notes as well that the “presence of minority elected officials is a 
recognized indicator of access to the process.”339 
It is true that minority representation is not Section 2’s only goal. The 
provision also tries to stop cruder practices that hinder minority voters’ access to 
the polls or disenfranchise them outright.340 It is true as well that minority 
representation is a controversial objective. Opponents of the 1982 amendments 
warned that the revisions would require proportionality in the election of 
minority officials.341 Justice Thomas famously has decried the whole concept of 
vote dilution as a “hopeless project” and a “disastrous misadventure.”342 And 
Justice Kennedy may believe that Section 2 only protects (and can ever compel) 
“naturally arising” majority-minority districts in minority-heavy areas.343 But 
these are largely dissenting voices. The prevailing view, at least in most court 
decisions and among most litigants, is that minority representation is indeed part 
of Section 2’s mission. As Lani Guinier remarks, “The belief that black 
representation is everything has defined litigation strategy under the Voting 
Rights Act.”344 
How, then, can Section 2 continue to secure minority representation in an 
integrating America? In fact, there are several ways, of varying potency and 
plausibility. First, and most intuitively, Gingles’s geographic compactness 
requirement could be eliminated. If minority groups did not have to be 
compact—that is, segregated—to establish liability, then dispersed groups would 
be able to prevail in vote dilution suits. Integration would not thwart them at the 
first step of the Gingles framework. The same point holds for remedies. If courts 
could order the creation of odd-looking districts containing scattered minority 
voters, then appropriate relief would be available for integrated plaintiffs. They 
would be able both to show a violation of Section 2 and to cure it.345 
                                                 
338 S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 207 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Senate Report]; see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 
U.S. 30, 48  n.15 (1986) (describing this factor as one of “the most important . . . bearing on § 2 challenges to 
multimember districts”). 
339 1982 Senate Report, supra note 338, at 193. And in the case law, the Supreme Court has made a 
minority group’s deviation from proportional representation one of the linchpins of Section 2 doctrine. See 
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1025 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The opinion’s central teaching is that 
proportionality . . . is always relevant evidence in determining vote dilution . . . .”). 
340 See supra note 268. It is also true that an argument can be made that Section 2 only seeks to provide 
representation to coherent geographic communities of minority voters. Indeed, I previously have advanced such 
a claim myself. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1379, 1416-19 (2012). The trouble with this claim is that it is based on Gingles and its progeny, not the 
statutory text or legislative history. There is virtually no indication in the text or history that Congress intended 
for Section 2 to be limited to compact minority clusters. See Karlan, supra note 290, at 199 (“Geographic 
concerns played only a minor role in the legislative history of amended Section 2.”). 
341 See, e.g., 1982 Senate Report, supra note 338, at 269 (additional views of Sen. Hatch) (claiming that 
amendments create a “clear and inevitable mandate for proportional representation”). 
342 Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892-93 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
343 See Richard H. Pildes, The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1139, 1146-47 (2007) (nothing this possibility). 
344 Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral 
Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (1991). 
345 For other scholars criticizing Gingles’s first prong, see Carstarphen, supra note 280, at 418 (“[T]he 
courts should begin by eliminating the compactness requirement . . . .”); and Karlan, supra note 290, at 202-03. 
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Second, and relatedly, the cause of action for racial gerrymandering could be 
discarded. This theory already has been criticized because it makes the message 
allegedly conveyed by a district a constitutional offense, even in the absence of 
any tangible injury.346 The theory has the additional drawback of rendering 
suspect the irregular districts that are needed to capture dispersed minority voters. 
These districts can be explained only on racial grounds, but any racial 
explanation triggers strict scrutiny, which the districts typically cannot survive. 
Accordingly, if the theory were cast aside, there would no longer be an equal 
protection threat to constituencies that enable integrated minorities to elect their 
preferred candidates. These districts would be valid under Section 2 and free 
from their current constitutional shadow.347 
Third, plaintiffs could start employing (and courts could start endorsing) 
additional techniques for measuring polarization. Surveys, in particular, hold 
enormous promise. Because they ask individuals about their electoral 
preferences, they avoid the ecological fallacy entirely. Their results are just as 
accurate whether precincts are racially homogeneous or heterogeneous, or 
whether there are two racial groups or more.348 The cost of surveys also is 
decreasing as online polling becomes more prevalent.349 Furthermore, statistical 
methods have emerged recently that allow public opinion in small geographic 
units to be calculated using modestly sized samples.350 And as Greiner and Kevin 
Quinn demonstrate, surveys can be combined with conventional techniques to 
produce more reliable polarization estimates than either approach alone. “[T]he 
hybrid is always preferable to the ecological model,” and also “dominates the 
survey sample estimator.”351 
Lastly, and most impactfully, litigants and courts could be more receptive to 
remedies other than single-member districts. No matter how cleverly they are 
drawn, it is difficult for such districts to enclose scattered minority voters—and 
impossible for them to provide representation to small minority groups. In 
contrast, multimember districts paired with cumulative, limited, or preferential 
                                                                                                                         
Precisely because of the incongruity of linking minority representation to residential segregation, the California 
Voting Rights Act, which otherwise mirrors its federal analogue, does not compel a showing of compactness. 
See Sanchez v. City of Modesto, 145 Cal. App. 4th 660, 667-70 (Cal. App. 2006). 
346 For an early critique of racial gerrymandering doctrine, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel 
Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 
650 (1993) (noting its “tremendous failings of intellectual coherence and practical application”). For the 
definitive work on the expressive harm contemplated by the doctrine, see Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. 
Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances 
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993). 
347 See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 346, at 618 (also criticizing racial gerrymandering doctrine 
because it “condemns ‘race-conscious’ attempts to craft minority districts from scattered minority communities, 
yet complacently relies upon massive residential discrimination to justify compact majority-minority districts”). 
348 Surveys, of course, have methodological issues of their own, such as high nonresponse rates, 
potentially nonrepresentative samples, questionable validity, and so on. See, e.g., Cottier v. City of Martin, 604 
F.3d 553, 559 (8th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing these concerns as reason not to credit exit poll in Section 2 case). 
349 For example, Survey Sampling International’s price for a nationwide online survey with 2,000 
respondents is only about $7,000. See SSI, http://www.surveysampling.com/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2015).  
350 See, e.g., ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND MULTILEVEL 
/ HIERARCHICAL MODELS (2007) (introducing multilevel regression and poststratification technique). 
351 D. James Greiner & Kevin M. Quinn, Exit Polling and Racial Bloc Voting: Combining Individual-
Level and R x C Ecological Data, 4 ANNALS OF APPLIED STAT. 1774, 1777 (2010). 
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voting face neither of these obstacles.352 They enable integrated minorities as 
well as minorities too small to constitute a local majority to elect the candidates 
of their choice.353 As Shaun Bowler and his coauthors find in a notable study, 
counties using cumulative or limited voting elect higher shares of black 
commissioners than counties using single-member districts.354 The alternative 
voting systems are unaffected by the geographic and numerical constraints that 
apply to traditional districts. 
All of these options are appealing because they could be implemented 
without legislative action. A Congress that cannot agree on a new coverage 
formula for the VRA’s other core provision, Section 5, is highly unlikely to 
amend Section 2 in any significant way.355 However, the first two proposals are 
only slightly more plausible than congressional intervention. The current Court is 
no fan of Section 2’s, having frequently limited its reach and raised doubts about 
its constitutionality.356 The odds thus are low that the Court, at least as presently 
composed, would scrap Gingles’s compactness requirement or reverse its racial 
gerrymandering rulings.  
This leaves the third and fourth options, both of which could be undertaken 
without any Court involvement. No Court precedent precludes either the use of 
surveys to measure polarization or the judicial imposition of alternative remedies. 
These steps, then, should be the top priorities for plaintiffs and lower courts who 
would like for Section 2 to keep promoting minority representation even as 
residential integration rises. They are the most realistic way to prevent a key 
statutory goal from being frustrated by a trend that ought to be irrelevant—but in 
fact is all too salient at every stage in the analysis. 
 
IV. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION LAW 
 
The final area I cover is constitutional rather than statutory: school 
desegregation law, which bans the intentional segregation of public schools and 
                                                 
352 Under cumulative voting, each voter has as many votes as there are seats to be filled, and can allocate 
these votes as she sees fit (including by casting multiple votes for a single candidate). Under limited voting, 
each voter has fewer votes than there are seats to be filled, and usually can cast up to one vote per candidate. 
And under preferential voting, each voter ranks the candidates in her order of preference, and these rankings 
then are used to fill the seats. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 281, at 835 (describing these systems). 
353 See id. at 846-55 (arguing at length for these systems). For other similar arguments, see Briffault, supra 
note 312, at 433-34; Guinier, supra note 280, at 1637; and Karlan, supra note 290, at 221. 
354 See SHAUN BOWLER ET AL., ELECTORAL REFORM AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION: LOCAL 
EXPERIMENTS WITH ALTERNATIVE ELECTIONS 100-01 (2003). 
355 Cf. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (noting that “Congress may draft another 
formula based on current conditions”). 
356 See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 26 (2009) (holding that first Gingles prong is satisfied only 
if it is possible to draw additional majority-minority district); id. at 21-23 (seeking to avoid “serious 
constitutional concerns [about Section 2] under the Equal Protection Clause”). Another argument against the 
first two proposals is that, while they might lead to greater descriptive representation for minorities, this benefit 
could come at the cost of reduced substantive representation. See, e.g., Charles Cameron et al., Do Majority-
Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794, 804-
09 (1996) (finding empirically that answer to title’s question is no). But see Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, 
Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 585-603 (2011) (explaining that 
there is no necessary tension between descriptive and substantive representation for minorities). 
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requires aggressive remedies to be maintained until all vestiges of the original 
violation have been eliminated. In this domain, of course, it is school segregation 
statistics that are crucial, not residential ones. I therefore begin this Part by 
summarizing the changes in, and causes of, school segregation. Public schools 
desegregated rapidly between the late 1960s and the late 1980s, and have 
sustained about the same level of racial separation ever since. The brisk drop was 
largely the result of judicial intervention, while the recent stasis comes from 
court orders being lifted while residential desegregation exerts a steady 
downward influence. 
Next, I describe the role that residential segregation historically played in 
school desegregation litigation. It created conditions in which school district 
policies could have a segregative effect, from which an inference of segregative 
intent then could be drawn. It also made it harder for integrative measures to 
succeed, and so hindered districts’ efforts to attain unitary status. I then argue 
that residential integration has the opposite doctrinal implications. To the extent 
it promotes school integration, it weighs against a finding of segregative intent. 
Also to this extent, it assists school districts seeking unitary status.  
Lastly, I comment on the state of school desegregation law as America 
continues to integrate residentially. On the positive side, there is reason to think 
that public schools will resume integrating in the near future, even if courts 
remain mostly somnolent, thanks to the ongoing residential trend. Less sunnily, 
the impact of this trend on school segregation is likely to be gradual, contingent 
on other factors, and less potent than judicial intervention. The impact, such as it 
is, also has no bearing on other racial imbalances in schools, involving faculty 
assignment, physical facilities, and the like. The need for courts to stay involved 
in this area—indeed, to become more involved—thus is undiminished. 
 
A. Trends and Causes 
 
School segregation is measured in the same way as residential segregation, 
only using different units. Public schools are the subunits in nearly all studies. 
School districts and metropolitan areas are the most common broader regions.357 
Enrollment data about these entities enables the calculation of both evenness 
metrics like the index of dissimilarity and exposure metrics like the index of 
isolation. Here, the dissimilarity index represents the fraction of students who 
would have to switch schools in order for every school in the district or 
metropolitan area to have the same racial makeup.358 Similarly, the isolation 
index indicates, for the typical student of a certain race, the share of students in 
her school who belong to the same racial group.359 As in the residential context, 
                                                 
357 See, e.g., CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION 57 (2004) (giving reasons for considering both school districts and metropolitan areas); John 
R. Logan et al., School Segregation in Metropolitan Regions, 1970-2000: The Impacts of Policy Choices on 
Public Education, 113 AM. J. SOC. 1611, 1622 (2008) (same). 
358 See, e.g., Reardon & Owens, supra note 33, at 3. 
359 See, e.g., id. at 4. 
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the dissimilarity index is preferred by most scholars because it is unaffected by 
group size and better captures the colloquial meaning of segregation.360 
In a helpful study, Logan and his coauthors compute the black-white 
dissimilarity index for school districts and metropolitan areas in 1970 (just as 
court-ordered desegregation began in earnest), 1990, and 2000.361 As shown in 
Figure 4, the score for the average district fell from close to 80% in 1970 to just 
under 50% in 1990 and 2000.362 The score for the average metropolitan area 
declined from about 80% in 1970 to roughly 65% in 1990 and 2000.363 
(Metropolitan area segregation is higher than school district segregation because 
each area’s districts vary—often starkly—in their racial complexions.) More 
recently, Kori Stroub and Meredith Richards estimate the entropy index (a more 
sophisticated variant of the dissimilarity index) at the metropolitan area level 
from 1993 to 2009.364 As also shown in Figure 4, black-white school segregation 
decreased slightly over this period.365 The overall picture thus is one of sharp 
desegregation from the late 1960s to the late 1980s, followed by stability ever 
since.366 
It is worth noting that certain scholars, in particular Erica Frankenberg and 
Gary Orfield, dispute this account. They claim that American schools actually are 
resegregating, based on data indicating that the typical black student now has a 
smaller share of white classmates, and is more likely to attend a heavily minority 
school, than in the 1980s.367 These shifts, however, are attributable entirely to 
demographic change (in particular, Hispanic and Asian immigration and the 
lower white birth rate), not to the distribution of students across schools.368 As 
                                                 
360 See, e.g., Jeremy E. Fiel, Decomposing School Resegregation: Social Closure, Racial Imbalance, and 
Racial Isolation, 20(10) AM. SOC. REV. 1, 2 (2013) (noting that because “measures of exposure are confounded 
with the population’s racial composition,” “[m]any sociologists . . . prefer measures of racial imbalance—also 
known as unevenness—to study school segregation”); John Logan, Resegregation in American Public Schools? 
Not in the 1990s 1 (Apr. 2004).  
361 See Logan et al., supra note 357, at 1622. 
362 See id. at 1628. 
363 See id. at 1627. 
364 See Kori J. Stroub & Meredith P. Richards, From Resegregation to Reintegration: Trends in the 
Racial/Ethnic Segregation of Metropolitan Public Schools, 1993-2009, 50 AM. EDUC. RESEARCH J. 497, 509 
(2013). 
365 See id. at 510. 
366 For more studies confirming this account, see Brian P. An & Adam Gamoran, Trends in School Racial 
Composition in the Era of Unitary Status, in FROM THE COURTROOM TO THE CLASSROOM: THE SHIFTING 
LANDSCAPE OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 19, 26 (Claire E. Smrekar & Ellen B. Goldring eds., 2009) (showing 
stability of various entropy indices from 1990 to 2000); Clotfelter et al., supra note 34, at 358 (same for several 
segregation metrics over 1993-2003 period); Fiel, supra note 360, at 2 (same for white-nonwhite entropy index 
over 1993-2010 period); Frankenberg, supra note 35, at 555 (same for black-white dissimilarity index from 
1990 to 2000); Christine H. Rossell & David J. Armor, The Effectiveness of School Desegregation Plans, 1968-
1991, 24 AM. POL. Q. 267, 274 (1996) (showing decline in black-white dissimilarity index from 1968 to 1991); 
Finis Welch et al., New Evidence on School Desegregation 39-43 (June 1987) (same from 1967 to 1985). 
367 See, e.g., ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE 
WE LOSING THE DREAM? 30-31 (2003); GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG, BROWN AT 60: GREAT 
PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT, AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 18 (2014). 
368 See, e.g., An & Gamoran, supra note 366, at 20; Clotfelter et al., supra note 34, at 381 (“[T]he rise in 
this measure is the result of demographic change rather than any growing racial imbalance among schools.”); 
Fiel, supra note 360, at 13 (showing that black-white and Hispanic-white exposure would have increased 
substantially from 1993 to 2010 had it not been for declining white share of student population); Logan et al., 
supra note 357, at 1; Reardon & Owens, supra note 33, at 8; Stroub & Richards, supra note 364, at 499. 
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whites become an ever smaller fraction of the student population, it is inevitable 
that minorities will be exposed to fewer of them.369 (It also is inevitable that 
whites will be exposed to more minorities, which implies more rather than less 
integration.370) I therefore join Logan and others in concluding that “[i]t is 
misleading to label these trends as resegregation,” and do not discuss them 
further.371 
Why does the trajectory of school segregation differ from that of residential 
segregation (which has declined steadily since 1970)? The answer is that 
residential segregation is just one of the drivers of school segregation. School 
segregation also is a function of three other sets of factors.372 First, the policies 
that school districts adopt can have significant integrative or segregative 
consequences. Measures (often court-imposed) such as adjusting attendance 
zones, busing students to diverse schools, and opening magnet schools that draw 
students of all races, can improve integration. On the other hand, neighborhood 
schools as well as school choice policies such as vouchers and charter schools 
can worsen racial separation.  
Second, the configuration of school districts themselves can influence 
metropolitan area segregation. In particular, the more districts there are in a given 
area, the more potential there is for segregation to develop between (rather than 
within) districts. And third, the racial profiles of public schools depend in part on 
the numbers and identities of students choosing to attend private schools. Public 
school segregation can be affected by exit from the public system. 
Of these factors, I focus here on school district policies adopted either in the 
wake of litigation or after the attainment of unitary status. These measures have 
larger impacts on school segregation than do school choice policies or private 
school enrollment.373 These measures also account nicely for the key features of 
                                                 
369 Whites now make up almost exactly 50% of the students in public schools, down from about 80% in 
the late 1960s. See Danielle Holley-Walker, A New Era for Desegregation, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 423, 431 
(2012); Racial/Ethnic Enrollment in Public Schools, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (May 2015), 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator-cge.asp.  
370 See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD ET AL., E PLURIBUS . . . SEPARATION? DEEPENING DOUBLE SEGREGATION FOR 
MORE STUDENTS 22 (2012) (showing decline in share of white classmates for typical white student). 
371 Logan, supra note 360, at 1; see also, e.g., An & Gamoran, supra note 366, at 24 (“[O]ne cannot make 
inferences about school segregation from exposure rates.”); Clotfelter et al., supra note 34, at 381 (commenting 
that isolation index “may have lost much of its meaning as a measure of racial segregation”); cf. Milliken v. 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 747 n.22 (1974) (dismissing claim that “‘actual desegregation’ could not be 
accomplished as long as the number of Negro students was greater than the number of white students”). 
372 See Sean F. Reardon & John T. Yun, Integrating Neighborhoods, Segregating Schools: The Retreat 
from School Desegregation in the South, 1990-2000, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1563, 1564-65 (2003) (offering similar set 
of explanations for school segregation). Also importantly, the causality between residential and school 
segregation runs in both directions. School desegregation orders often cause whites to move out of school 
districts, thus increasing residential segregation. See, e.g., Nathaniel Baum-Snow & Byron F. Lutz, School 
Desegregation, School Choice, and Changes in Residential Location Patterns by Race, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 
3019, 3033 (2011). However, this effect is muted when less aggressive desegregative techniques are used, see, 
e.g., Rossell & Armor, supra note 366, at 288, and when school districts encompass most of their metropolitan 
areas, see, e.g., Kendra Bischoff, School District Fragmentation and Racial Residential Segregation: How Do 
Boundaries Matter?, 44 URB. AFF. REV. 182, 199 (2008). 
373 The consensus in the literature is that school choice policies and private school enrollment have small 
negative impacts on school segregation. White students are more likely to take advantage of these options, and 
then more likely to make enrollment decisions that have segregative consequences. See, e.g., An & Gamoran, 
supra note 366, at 22 (finding that “inclusion of private schools in our analysis does little to change the overall 
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the post-1960s history of school segregation: a generation of improvement 
followed by a generation of stagnation.374 And since the Supreme Court has ruled 
out inter-district remedies (such as district consolidation) in almost all cases, 
these measures are the only ones that realistically are subject to judicial 
control.375 
Starting with court orders to desegregate, then, they were issued to about 750 
school districts, mostly in the South and mostly in the late 1960s and 1970s.376 
These orders typically required attendance zone adjustment, busing, magnet 
schools, majority-to-minority transfers, or other integrative steps.377 Thousands 
of additional districts took similar actions on their own, often in an effort to avoid 
litigation.378 In a recent study, Sarah Reber finds that the white-nonwhite 
dissimilarity index plummeted in school districts that were compelled to 
desegregate.379 As displayed in Figure 4, segregation fell by about 20% in the 
two years after judicial intervention, and then maintained these gains for more 
than a decade.380 Other studies come to very similar conclusions.381 
Next, school districts began attaining unitary status in large numbers in the 
1990s and 2000s, after a trio of Supreme Court decisions made release from 
judicial supervision easier to obtain.382 About two-thirds of districts ever subject 
to desegregation orders now have been deemed unitary, leaving only about 250 
still required to abide by them.383 Most unitary districts eventually abandon their 
integrative policies and revert to neighborhood schools.384 In a study of all school 
                                                                                                                         
levels of school segregation”); Fiel, supra note 360, at 5; Meredith P. Richards, The Gerrymandering of School 
Attendance Zones and the Segregation of Public Schools: A Geospatial Analysis, 51 AM. EDUC. RESEARCH J. 
1119, 1120 (2014); Saporito & Sohoni, supra note 46, at 94 (finding that black-white dissimilarity index is 
slightly higher than expected due to white exit to charter and private schools).  
374 See infra notes 376-388 and accompanying text. 
375 See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745 (holding that an inter-district remedy is available only if there has been 
an inter-district violation). According to the literature, the consolidation of school districts substantially 
improves school segregation (and vice versa). See, e.g., Paul M. Ong & Jordan Rickles, The Continued Nexus 
Between School and Residential Segregation, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 379, 387 (2004) (“Metropolitan 
areas where the primary school students are concentrated in a few districts . . . are more likely to have [low] 
school segregation levels . . . .”); Sarah J. Reber, Court-Ordered Desegregation: Successes and Failures 
Integrating American Schools Since Brown v. Board of Education, 40 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 559, 580 (2005) 
(finding that larger number of school districts in metropolitan area reduces nonwhite-white exposure index). 
376 See Sean Reardon et al., Brown Fades: The End of Court-Ordered School Desegregation and the 
Resegregation of American Public Schools, 31 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 876, 882 (2012) (identifying 755 
school districts ever subject to court desegregation orders); Reber, supra note 375, at 561 (showing geography 
and timing of court desegregation orders). 
377 See Rossell & Armor, supra note 366, at 278-82. 
378 See id. at 291. 
379 See Reber, supra note 375, at 568-69. 
380 See id. 
381 See, e.g., Rucker C. Johnson, Long-Run Impacts of School Desegregation and School Quality on Adult 
Attainments 11 (Jan. 2011) (using same analytical design and finding that desegregation orders reduce black-
white dissimilarity index by about 20%); Rossell & Armor, supra note 366, at 292 (15% reduction for black-
white dissimilarity index); Welch et al., supra note 366, at 50 (30% reduction for black-white dissimilarity 
index); see also Logan et al., supra note 357, at 1631 (finding that metropolitan dissimilarity index decreases in 
1990 and 2000 as share of children subject to desegregation order increases).  
382 These decisions were Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); 
and Board v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). See also Reardon et al., supra note 376, at 887 (showing dismissals 
of desegregative orders from 1991 to 2009). 
383 See id. at app’x tbl.A1. 
384 See id. at 899 (noting that evidence supports view that “most districts adopt neighborhood-based 
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districts freed from desegregation orders, Reardon and his coauthors show that 
their black-white dissimilarity index increased moderately during the fifteen 
years after release.385 Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 4, segregation rose by 
about 5% over this period, or roughly one-quarter of the decrease originally 
attributable to judicial intervention.386 Again, other studies covering fewer 
districts generate almost the same results.387 
These findings about desegregation orders and unitary status, in conjunction 
with the ongoing decline in residential segregation, explain the trajectory of 
school segregation over the last half-century. Between the late 1960s and the late 
1980s, demography and the judiciary operated in tandem. Rising residential 
integration pushed schools, slowly but surely, in the same integrative direction. 
Concurrently, court-ordered remedies cut school segregation more sharply than 
the residential trend ever could. But from the late 1980s to the present, 
demographic and judicial forces have worked at cross purposes. On its own, 
residential integration would have produced further school integration. This 
positive influence has been neutralized, though, by the unitary status that courts 
have granted to hundreds of school districts. The outcome of these countervailing 
pressures has been a draw—stasis where there would have been improvement 
had the judiciary stayed its hand.388 
That so few school districts remain subject to court supervision (about 250 
out of roughly 14,000 nationwide389) also suggests that residential and school 
segregation now are tied more tightly than in the past. When courts in an earlier 
era insisted on sweeping remedies, they decoupled the link between the two 
forms of segregation. Schools became integrated even as housing patterns stayed 
racially separated. But now that courts largely have left the stage, and most 
districts have exploited their departure to return to neighborhood schools, 
residential segregation should be a stronger predictor of school segregation. The 
integrative policies that dilute its impact mostly are no more. 
This hypothesis turns out to be correct. In a multiple regression model of 
black-white metropolitan area school segregation, the coefficient for black-white 
residential segregation jumped from 0.58 in 1970 to 0.94 in 1990.390 The raw 
correlation between these two indices then increased again from 0.70 in 1990 to 
                                                                                                                         
school assignment policies following the release from court order”). 
385 See id. at 891-99. 
386 See id. at 891. 
387 See, e.g., An & Gamoran, supra note 366, at 41 (finding that unitary status increases white-nonwhite 
entropy index by 2% to 6%); Clotfelter et al., supra note 34, at 377 (5% increase for white-nonwhite 
dissimilarity index); Byron Lutz, The End of Court-Ordered Desegregation, 3 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 130, 
145 (2011) (6% increase for black-white dissimilarity index). 
388 For examples of other scholars taking similar positions, see An & Gamoran, supra note 366, at 22 
(“[H]ad it not been for declarations of unitary status, school segregation would have declined . . . .”); Clotfelter 
et al., supra note 34, at 366; Frankenberg, supra note 35, at 551; and Reardon & Owens, supra note 33, at 13 
(“[T]his decline in residential segregation . . . offset some of the increasing segregation due to the decline in 
desegregation efforts.”). 
389 See Reardon et al., supra note 376, at app’x tbl.A1; School Districts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/did/www/schooldistricts (last visited Aug. 1, 2015). 
390 See Logan et al., supra note 357, at 1631 (using dissimilarity index to measure segregation). 
Unfortunately, none of the studies that jointly examine residential and school segregation do so at the school 
district (as opposed to metropolitan area) level. How the two measures are related at this level thus is unknown. 
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0.83 in 2000.391 And as shown in Figure 4, the correlation between black-white 
residential segregation (for the under-eighteen population) and black-white 
school segregation rose once again from 2000 to 2010.392 Residential segregation 
now accounts for an incredible 91% of the variation in school segregation at the 
metropolitan area level.393 
I address the implications of this strengthening bond at the end of this Part. In 
brief, it means that school segregation should resume declining in the future, 
even without judicial intervention, as long as residential patterns continue 
integrating. Below, though, I turn from empirics to doctrine. I first show how 
residential segregation historically assisted plaintiffs in school desegregation 
cases, at both the liability and unitary status stages. I then argue that residential 
integration throws a wrench into this area of law as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
391 See Erica Frankenberg, Metropolitan Schooling and Housing Integration, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & 
CMTY. DEV. L. 193, 204 (2009) (using dissimilarity index). Other studies also have found an increase in the 
correlation between residential and school segregation during the 1990s. See, e.g., An & Gamoran, supra note 
366, at 36 (using entropy index); Reardon & Yun, supra note 372, at 1590-93 (using entropy index and 
analyzing South only). 
392 See Frankenberg, supra note 35, at 557-58 (using dissimilarity index). 
393 See id. at 558. 
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FIGURE 4: TRENDS IN, AND CAUSES OF, SCHOOL SEGREGATION394 
 
 
B. Connection 
 
A plaintiff’s initial task in a school desegregation case is to establish 
segregative intent—to prove that a school district deliberately separated students 
by race.395 The most direct way that residential segregation can support an 
inference of segregative intent is by helping to produce school segregation, from 
                                                 
394 See Frankenberg, supra note 35, at 557-58; Logan et al., supra note 357, at 1622; Reardon et al., supra 
note 376, at 891; Reber, supra note 375, at 569; Stroub & Richards, supra note 364, at 510. 
395 See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (noting that “differentiating factor 
between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate”). 
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which an invidious motive then can be deduced. Residential segregation can give 
rise to school segregation, which in turn can give rise to liability.396 
A 1960s case involving the school system of Manhasset, a New York City 
suburb, illustrates this logical sequence. One of Manhasset’s neighborhoods was 
over 90% black, while the rest of the town was almost entirely white.397 For 
decades, the school district maintained a “rigid neighborhood school policy” that 
resulted in 99% of white students attending all-white schools and all black 
students attending a school that was 94% black.398 “On the facts of this case,” 
without the district having done anything other than retain its neighborhood 
school policy, the court found “state imposed segregation.”399 
Similarly, Corpus Christi exhibited “substantial residential concentration by 
ethnic groups” in the 1970s, with blacks and Hispanics “concentrated in a narrow 
area.”400 Here too, the school district adhered for decades to a “neighborhood 
school plan composed of geographic attendance zones” that yielded stark school 
segregation.401 And here too, the Fifth Circuit held that the Constitution was 
violated. “The Board imposed a neighborhood school plan . . . upon a clear and 
established pattern of residential segregation in the face of an obvious and 
inevitable result.”402 
However, cases in which liability follows so closely from residential 
segregation are unusual.403 This is because school segregation alone, even if 
caused by segregated housing patterns, typically is not enough to make out a 
constitutional violation. As one treatise puts it, “Statistics demonstrating a racial 
imbalance in the racial composition of individual schools, by themselves, will 
probably not be sufficient” “to prove intentional or purposeful segregation.”404 At 
this stage, then, the more common role of residential segregation is somewhat 
more indirect. Rather than lead at once to culpability, it creates conditions in 
                                                 
396 As throughout the Article, I deal here with the legal implications of de facto, not de jure, residential 
segregation. De jure residential segregation can lead to liability even more directly since, assuming it causes de 
facto school segregation, segregative intent does not have to be inferred. An invidious motive is established by 
the de jure segregation. Cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 756 (1974) (noting that “purposeful racially 
discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws” can result in liability in school desegregation case and 
justify imposition of inter-district remedy). 
397 See Blocker v. Bd. of Ed., 226 F. Supp. 208, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). 
398 Id. at 212, 226. 
399 Id. at 226. 
400 Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 146 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc). 
401 Id.; see also id. at 145-46 (providing school segregation statistics). 
402 Id. at 149. For other examples of residential segregation giving rise to school segregation and then to 
liability, see Hart v. Community Sch. Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 755 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (“We cannot ignore the fact 
that the system of geographic school attendance, imposed upon segregated housing patterns, provides the broad 
base for racial isolation . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); and Bradley v. School Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67, 
84 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev’d on other grounds, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972) (“School authorities may not 
constitutionally arrange an attendance zone system which serves only to reproduce in school facilities the 
prevalent pattern of housing segregation.”). 
403 Notably, all of the cases of this kind that I have found predate Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976), in which the Supreme Court clarified that the Equal Protection Clause is violated by discriminatory 
intent, not discriminatory effect. 
404 1 RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS, AND 
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 5:9 (2014); see also, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 413 
(1977) (noting that school segregation “is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the absence of a 
showing that this condition resulted from intentionally segregative actions”). 
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which school district policies such as new school construction and attendance 
zone adjustment can have a segregative effect. Segregative intent then is inferred 
from a district’s voluntary decision to adopt these policies. 
Examples of residential segregation serving this function abound, including 
in the Supreme Court’s case law. In a 1973 decision, the Court dealt with the 
school system of Denver, one of whose neighborhoods, Park Hill, was 
“substantially Negro and segregated.”405 The school district used “various 
techniques such as the manipulation of student attendance zones, school site 
selection, and a neighborhood school policy” to keep the Park Hill schools 
heavily black and the schools in adjoining areas heavily white.406 In particular, 
the district built a new school “in the middle of the Negro community,” where 
many blacks and few whites would attend it, rather than in a location that would 
promote integration.407 These actions persuaded the Court that the district “had 
engaged in . . . deliberate racial segregation.”408 
Likewise, in a 1979 case, the Court confronted the school system of 
Columbus, whose near east side was “then and now [a] black residential area.”409 
The school district established “optional attendance zones” that “allowed 
students in a small, white enclave” in the near east side “to escape attendance at 
black schools.”410 The district also provided for a “group of white students [to be] 
bused past their neighborhood school to a ‘whiter’ school.”411 And through 
“[g]errymandering of boundary lines,” the district ensured that “white residential 
areas were removed from the black school’s zone and black students were 
contained within that zone.”412 All of these steps had a segregative impact on 
Columbus’s schools because of the city’s underlying residential segregation. And 
in combination, they led to the Court’s conclusion that the district was guilty of 
“intentionally segregative actions.”413 
While the liability stage of school desegregation litigation is important, it has 
become quite rare in recent years. According to one study, in only a single case 
since 1990 has a school district been found culpable and then ordered to adopt a 
mandatory student assignment plan.414 Far more frequent now is the unitary 
status proceeding, in which a district tries to convince a court that it should be 
                                                 
405 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 260 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
406 Id. at 191. 
407 Id. at 192. 
408 Id. 
409 Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 506 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
410 Id. at 461 n.8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
411 Id. at 462 n.9. 
412 Id. at 462 n.10. 
413 Id. at 463-64. For other examples of residential segregation enabling school district policies to have a 
segregative effect, from which segregative intent then is inferred, see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 7 (1971) (involving “locating schools in Negro residential areas and fixing the size of the 
schools”); and United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d 162, 171 (5th Cir. 1977) (involving “the 
construction and abandonment of schools, the selection of school sites . . . and the drawing of student 
attendance zones”). 
414 See Lutz, supra note 387, at 133. Of course, multiple school desegregation suits have been brought in 
this period. 
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released from judicial supervision.415 Unitary status is granted if a district has 
complied in good faith with a court’s desegregation order, and if any “vestiges of 
past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable.”416 
“Vestiges” refer to racial imbalances in school enrollment and other areas,417 and 
are presumed to have been “proximately caused by intentional state action during 
the prior de jure era.”418 
Under this framework, residential segregation often prevents the achievement 
of unitary status by reducing the effectiveness of integrative measures and so 
fostering school segregation. The school segregation then is deemed a vestige of 
the original constitutional violation that has yet to be eliminated. For instance, 
Louisville was under a school desegregation order in the 1970s, and also 
experienced a rise in residential segregation due to a “trend . . . definitely toward 
‘white flight.’”419 The segregative housing trend caused school attendance zones 
that had been designed to promote integration to stop working as planned. “[A]s 
blacks moved into [each] attendance area, the school would naturally become 
‘blacker,’ particularly since whites would ‘flee.’”420 Many of Louisville’s schools 
thus remained racially identifiable, prompting the Sixth Circuit to hold that “[a]ll 
vestiges of state-imposed segregation have not been eliminated.”421 
Similarly, Dallas was under a school desegregation order in the 1980s, when 
it “resemble[d] a pie in which one whole ‘wedge’ is made up of black residents, 
from the center of the district all the way to its outermost boundary.”422 This 
residential segregation, in combination with the city’s geographic sprawl and 
surging minority population, undermined all of the integrative policies the district 
attempted.423 Attendance zone adjustment produced only limited improvement in 
the face of the city’s difficult demography.424 Busing was infeasible due to the 
city’s traffic and size.425 And few students took advantage of voluntary majority-
to-minority transfers that required them to enroll in schools far from their 
homes.426 Thanks to these obstacles, Dallas’s schools stayed highly 
                                                 
415 See supra notes 382-383 and accompanying text. 
416 Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249 (1991). 
417 See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968) (noting that racial imbalances can exist not only 
in “composition of student bodies” but also in “faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and 
facilities”). 
418 United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 745 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Freeman v. Pitts, 
503 U.S. 467, 505 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing “presumption, effectively irrebuttable . . . that any 
current racial imbalance is the product of that violation, at least if the imbalance has continuously existed”). 
419 Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 489 F.2d 925, 929 (6th Cir. 1973), vac’d on other 
grounds, 418 U.S. 918 (1974). 
420 Id. at 928. 
421 Id. at 929. 
422 Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 701 (N.D. Tex. 1981), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 713 F.2d 90 (5th 
Cir. 1983). 
423 See id. at 699-700 (noting rise of minority student population from 42% in 1970 to 70% in 1980).  
424 See id. at 713-44. 
425 See id. 
426 See id. at 748 (“[M]ost minorities would prefer to stay at home than travel to a far distant school that 
can still accept transfers of minority students.”). 
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segregated427—and thanks to this persistent segregation, the court ruled that 
“vestiges of the previous segregated system remain today.”428 
It is important to note, though, that residential segregation does not always 
prevent unitary status from being granted. Especially in more recent cases, it 
sometimes facilitates school districts’ release from judicial supervision. This is 
because courts today focus less on the extent of school segregation (which 
residential segregation tends to heighten), and more on districts’ responsibility 
for enrollment imbalances. Residential segregation is the most powerful force 
affecting school composition that is not under districts’ control. So if it is the 
only reason for continuing school segregation, then the resulting imbalances are 
not a vestige of the original constitutional violation. Rather, they are attributable 
to an independent demographic factor, and the chain of causality is broken.429 
The most famous case of residential segregation helping a school district 
achieve unitary status arose in 1992 in DeKalb County, a suburban area near 
Atlanta. The county’s school system was placed under a desegregation order in 
1969.430 In the ensuing years, “radical demographic changes” took place, causing 
the “northern half of DeKalb County [to become] predominantly white and the 
southern half [to become] predominantly black.”431 This residential trend, in turn, 
led to severe school segregation: “50% of the black students attended schools that 
were over 90% black,” while “27% of white students attended schools that were 
more than 90% white.”432 The Supreme Court nevertheless held that the district 
had earned unitary status. The “population changes which occurred . . . were not 
caused by the [district’s] policies,” so the “current racial imbalance” was not a 
“vestige of the prior de jure system.”433 
The dual role that residential segregation plays at the unitary status stage—
helping both to trigger and to rebut the presumption that continuing school 
segregation stems from the original constitutional violation—distinguishes this 
area from the others I have covered. The duality means that, here at least, 
residential segregation is not an unalloyed advantage for civil rights plaintiffs. 
                                                 
427 See id. at 692-95. 
428 Id. at 706. For other examples of unitary status being denied in part due to the impact of residential 
segregation on school segregation, see Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 721 F.2d 1425, 1435 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (“The Board’s reliance on housing patterns as justification for the continued existence of one-race 
schools is not only factually but legally unsound.”); and Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1289-90 (8th 
Cir. 1980) (en banc) (explaining how residential segregation interacted with school district policies to produce 
school segregation after entry of original desegregation order). 
429 See James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases, 
81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 1671 (2003) (“[D]emographic changes that occur after a court has implemented a 
desegregation decree can suffice to sever the link between prior acts of segregation and current levels of racial 
imbalance.”). 
430 See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 477 (1992). 
431 Id. at 475 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
432 Id. at 476. 
433 Id. at 494, 496. For other examples of residential segregation helping school districts achieve unitary 
status, see Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 (1976) (granting unitary status where 
enrollment imbalances were caused by “changes in the demographs of Pasadena’s residential patterns” and not 
by “any segregative actions”); and Ross v. Housing Indep. Sch. Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 219 (5th Cir. 1983) (same 
where “the homogeneous student composition of the schools does not stem from the unconstitutional 
segregation . . . but from population changes that have occurred since this litigation commenced”). 
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Rather, it benefits them if courts emphasize the resulting enrollment imbalances 
(as they usually did before the 1990s). But it weakens plaintiffs’ position if courts 
stress the causal link between district policies and school segregation (as they 
tend to do today). Fortunately, this complexity does not apply to the doctrinal 
implications of rising residential integration. As I argue next, this trend usually 
assists school districts, at both the liability and unitary status stages. 
 
C. Complication 
 
Begin with the liability stage. Just as residential segregation can support an 
inference of segregative intent more or less directly, so too can residential 
integration lead to the opposite conclusion in more or less straightforward ways. 
More directly, integrating housing can result in integrating schools, from which 
an invidious motive is harder to deduce. More circuitously, residential integration 
can create conditions in which school district policies that otherwise would have 
a segregative effect in fact have neutral or integrative consequences. An intent to 
segregate then cannot be inferred as easily from a district’s adoption of these 
policies. 
Both of these causal pathways were on display in a 1980s case from Prince 
George’s County, a suburban region adjoining Washington, D.C. The county 
underwent “widespread and naturally occurring racial integration” during the 
1970s, which caused the “distribution of th[e] minority population [to] become 
quite widespread and generalized.”434 The county also reduced its busing of 
students and established more neighborhood schools—steps that could have 
increased school segregation sharply, but did not due to the residential 
integration.435 Faced with this positive housing trend, as well as potentially 
segregative policies whose impact was blunted by the trend, the court could not 
find segregative intent. “[P]laintiffs have not met their burden of proving that 
defendants acted with a racially discriminatory purpose in implementing the . . . 
busing reversals.”436 
Likewise, Charles City County, Virginia was residentially integrated in the 
1960s, when there were “no predominantly White or Negro areas” and “[p]eople 
of all of the races reside[d] throughout the entire county.”437 The county adopted 
a freedom-of-choice plan that allowed each student to select which school to 
attend.438 Such plans often failed to achieve meaningful school integration in this 
era,439 but the county’s succeeded because of its favorable residential landscape. 
As the court observed, “freedom of choice had brought about a considerable 
                                                 
434 Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ., 574 F. Supp. 1280, 1364-65 (D. Md. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 758 
F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1319 (noting that dissimilarity index 
in county “dipped from 62 in 1970 to 50 in 1980”). 
435 See id. at 1363 (describing gap between predicted rise in school segregation due to busing cutback and 
rise that actually occurred).  
436 Id. at 1370. 
437 Bowman v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 293 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1968). 
438 See id. at 1203. 
439 See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 440 (1968) (“[T]he general experience under ‘freedom of 
choice’ to date has been such as to indicate its ineffectiveness as a tool of desegregation.”). 
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amount of school desegregation,” and “every White student in the county 
presently attends an integrated school.”440 The court therefore upheld the plan, 
adding that it was “leading to the abolition of a system of segregation.”441 
However, residential integration certainly does not preclude liability. In fact, 
if a school district enacts policies that manage to have a segregative effect despite 
an improvement in housing patterns, it may be easier to infer segregative intent. 
For example, “residential segregation in Rockford[, Illinois] decreased during the 
1970s and 1980s.”442 But school segregation rose in the district due to attendance 
zone manipulation and the “one-way busing of minority students.”443 The 
contrasting housing and enrollment trends convinced the court that the “clearly 
predominant cause of segregation in [Rockford] schools was the . . . affirmative 
segregative conduct by the [district], and not residential segregation.”444 
Next consider the unitary status stage. Residential integration typically helps 
school districts seeking to be released from judicial supervision because it causes 
integrative measures to be more effective and so increases school integration. 
This improvement then suggests that there remain fewer (or no) vestiges of the 
original constitutional violation—and thus that districts can be entrusted to 
manage their own affairs again. Enrollment statistics are vital evidence in any 
unitary status proceeding,445 and residential integration usually makes them more 
balanced. 
For instance, Oklahoma City was under a school desegregation order in the 
1990s, and experienced a remarkable drop in residential segregation during the 
two prior decades. Its black-white dissimilarity index fell from 87% in 1972 to 
48% in 1992.446 Over this period, the school district relied on integrative 
techniques including “pairing, clustering, and compulsory busing.”447 Aided by 
the auspicious housing trend, these techniques led to a sharp decline in school 
segregation. The black-white dissimilarity index for the district’s schools plunged 
from 78% in 1971 to 24% in 1984.448 This impressive progress indicated that the 
district “had eradicated the vestiges of the dual system and was entitled to have 
the desegregation decree dissolved.”449 
Similarly, Fort Worth was under a school desegregation order in the 1980s, 
and underwent the “natural integration of residential neighborhoods” in the 
                                                 
440 Bowman, 293 F. Supp. at 1204-05. 
441 Id. at 1206. For another example of residential integration helping to prevent segregative intent from 
being inferred, see Price v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 945 F.2d 1307, 1316 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding ruling in 
favor of Austin school district where there was “ongoing dispersion of Black persons . . . into areas formerly 
dominated by majority persons” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
442 People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 851 F.Supp. 905, 1205 (N.D. Ill. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 111 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 1997). 
443 Id. 
444 Id. 
445 See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 474 (1992) (“[A] critical beginning point is the degree of racial 
imbalance in the school district . . . .”). 
446 See Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs., 778 F. Supp. 1144, 1164 (W.D. Okla. 1991) 
(citing projected score for 1992). 
447 Id. at 1156. 
448 See id. at 1173. 
449 Id. at 1148. 
                Desegregating America                                            62 
 
1970s.450 Areas that were “virtually all-white in 1970” became “more and more 
integrated according to 1980 census figures.”451 This improvement in housing 
patterns enhanced the integrative impact of school district policies such as busing 
and a “pyramid feeder system.”452 As the court noted, the “desegregation devices 
employed . . . were effective in integrating the schools.”453 The court therefore 
concluded that the district had “eliminate[ed] all vestiges of discrimination” and 
was “unitary in every respect.”454 
But just as residential integration does not preclude liability, it also does not 
guarantee unitary status. If a school district fails to adopt integrative measures 
that take advantage of the favorable housing trend, then its school enrollments 
may remain racially imbalanced. In turn, these imbalances may be deemed 
vestiges of the original violation that require judicial supervision to be 
maintained. This is precisely what happened to Topeka in the 1990s.455 Its black 
population “spread widely throughout the eastern part of the city” and also 
“beg[a]n to move into the western side.”456 But the district built new schools in 
areas where they “promot[ed] racial separation,” designed attendance zones that 
“did not further the process of desegregation,” and did not consider more potent 
remedies such as busing and magnet schools.457 As a result, Topeka’s schools did 
not integrate to the same extent as its homes, and the Tenth Circuit held that the 
district was not entitled to unitary status.458 
Accordingly, residential integration is a contingent rather than an automatic 
asset for school districts, at both the liability and unitary status stages. It does set 
the stage for integrative policies to make schools markedly less segregated. But 
districts must bite the bullet and actually enact these policies. If they are 
unwilling to do so, their racial imbalances are likely to linger, and they may be 
unable to extricate themselves from litigation. 
To this proviso I should add the one I noted earlier in the FHA and VRA 
contexts—namely, that cases in which residential segregation benefits plaintiffs 
substantially outnumber those in which residential integration aids defendants.459 
If anything, this caveat is even more important here. Unlike residential 
segregation, school segregation has not declined in recent years, but rather has 
held roughly constant.460 In addition, few school desegregation suits have been 
                                                 
450 Flax v. Potts, 725 F. Supp. 322, 329 (N.D. Tex. 1989). 
451 Id. 
452 Id. at 324. 
453 Id. 
454 Id. at 330. For other examples of residential integration helping school districts seeking unitary status, 
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455 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1993); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Topeka, 892 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1989), vac’d, 503 U.S. 978 (1992) (Topeka I). 
456 Topeka I, 892 F.2d at 856. 
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launched in the last generation.461 The set of cases in which residential 
integration could make a legal difference thus is doubly small: first, because the 
improvement in housing has yet to translate into equivalent progress in 
enrollments; and second, because the volume of relevant litigation is so low 
anyway. 
But these are practical rather than conceptual qualifications. They do not 
undermine the key points that residential integration does complicate matters for 
school desegregation plaintiffs, and that these difficulties are apt to intensify as 
the integrative trend continues. They also do not challenge the statistical picture 
of school segregation I painted earlier. Below, then, I discuss the role that school 
desegregation law is likely to play in a more residentially integrated America. 
My outlook is conflicted—optimistic because of the tightening link between 
residential and school segregation, but skeptical because of the link’s inherent 
contingency and its irrelevance to certain racial imbalances. 
 
D. Conciliation 
 
From one angle, the prognosis for school desegregation doctrine is as 
positive as that for the FHA.462 One of the FHA’s goals is ending residential 
segregation. Likewise, the “ultimate end” of the doctrine is a “nonracial system 
of public education.”463 Residential segregation has fallen sharply in the last half-
century. So has school segregation (though with a lull since the late 1980s), and it 
should resume declining in the future now that it is tied so closely to residential 
segregation.464 Therefore both the FHA and school desegregation law are making 
progress toward the achievement of one of their core objectives. Cue the 
celebration. 
Adding to the positivity is the fact that residential integration makes 
voluntary policies to desegregate schools—enacted in the absence of a court 
order—more likely to be upheld. For the sake of brevity, I have not covered the 
complex case law on the constitutionality of these measures.465 In brief, though, 
residential segregation often necessitates aggressive actions such as assigning 
students to schools on the basis of race, which are highly suspect under current 
law.466 In contrast, more modest steps such as adjusting attendance zones and 
basing school assignments on neighborhood (rather than student) characteristics 
can be quite effective under integrating conditions.467 These policies usually have 
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been deemed valid by the courts,468 and if they were adopted more widely, they 
would lead to further school desegregation. 
There are several flies in this ointment, though. First, even if school 
segregation declines at the same rate as residential segregation from this point 
forward (by no means a certainty), the resulting progress will be frustratingly 
slow. As noted earlier, the residential black-nonblack dissimilarity index has 
fallen by about 5% per decade since 1970.469 But the typical court desegregation 
order in the 1960s and 1970s resulted in a 20% decrease in school segregation 
within just two years470—and there were cases of decrees producing as much as 
an 80% drop.471 Sitting back and allowing the favorable housing trend to take its 
course thus is plainly a less productive strategy than judicial intervention or 
voluntary desegregation. Passivity is likely to produce gains, but only 
incremental ones. 
Second, as I have stressed, the relationship between residential segregation 
and school segregation is highly contingent on school district policies. At 
present, most districts have chosen policies, neighborhood schools in particular, 
that cause residential segregation to be an excellent predictor of school 
segregation.472 But in the future, districts could take actions, such as attendance 
zone manipulation, new school construction, and certain school choice initiatives, 
that prevent declines in residential segregation from materializing in school 
systems.473 True, these measures could be challenged on the ground that they 
were adopted with segregative intent. But lawsuits of this sort seldom have 
succeeded in recent years.474 
And third, racial imbalances in enrollments are not the only ones that school 
desegregation doctrine seeks to eliminate. In a 1968 case, the Supreme Court 
famously held that the doctrine applies “not just to the composition of student 
bodies” but also to “every facet of school operations—faculty, staff, 
transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities.”475 These other areas, 
however, are largely unrelated to residential patterns. That housing is integrating 
in a school district does not mean that its teachers are allocated without regard to 
race, that its minority and white students have access to the same resources, or 
that its schools are equally conducive to learning. Whatever optimism stems from 
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the residential progress, then, does not extend to aspects of school systems that 
are mostly impervious to it. 
Putting aside these aspects (which are beyond this project’s scope), how 
could the law promote more extensive school integration?476 One option, alluded 
to above, would be to permit all voluntary desegregation policies, including 
explicitly race-conscious ones. The more limited measures that courts currently 
allow are helpful, especially in areas where residential patterns are integrating.477 
But as Frankenberg and Genevieve Siegel-Hawley observe, they are “less likely 
to produce racial integration than former plans that relied upon race as a single 
assignment criteri[on].”478 If these former plans were put back on the table, they 
could generate larger gains than their weaker replacements. 
Another possibility would be to tighten the connection between school 
segregation on the one hand, and liability and the maintenance of judicial 
supervision on the other. If segregative intent could be inferred more directly 
from segregated schools, then plaintiffs would have less difficulty establishing 
culpability and compelling school districts to take desegregative actions.479 
Similarly, if the presumption that enrollment imbalances result from the original 
constitutional violation were strengthened, then districts’ ability to attain unitary 
status—and then switch to neighborhood schools—would be curtailed. The stark 
reality of racially separated schools again would become the doctrine’s fulcrum. 
Of course, both of these suggestions fly in the face of recent Supreme Court 
decisions. The Court has rejected overtly race-conscious voluntary 
desegregation.480 It also has made it progressively easier for school districts to be 
deemed unitary, even if their schools (and homes) remain segregated.481 Given 
current law, then, the best course of action for proponents of school integration 
simply may be to sue more often. Yes, new school desegregation suits are a rarity 
these days.482 But unlike unitary status proceedings, the doctrine that applies to 
them has not been narrowed by the Court’s recent precedents. Many examples 
also exist, from around the country and over several decades, of plaintiffs 
managing to prove illicit intent even in the absence of formal segregative 
policies.483 And as several commentators have noted, there is no shortage today 
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of district practices that certainly seem aimed at keeping students racially 
separated.484 
This is not to say that litigation should be launched willy-nilly. Especially in 
minority-heavy urban districts in the Midwest and Northeast, there may be little 
that suits can accomplish given the usual ban on inter-district remedies.485 But 
districts in the South and West tend to encompass both minority-heavy urban 
areas and whiter suburban and exurban regions.486 In the Midwest and Northeast 
too, suburban districts are becoming ever more diverse.487 There would be a wide 
array of targets, then, for a renewed campaign to combat school segregation 
through the courts. Such a campaign might lose many of its battles—but the ones 
it won likely would produce more integration than any other tactic.488 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I have tried to make two contributions in this Article. The first is to document 
and then explain the striking decline in residential segregation since 1970. This 
decline is one of the most important sociological developments of the last half-
century. But to date, it has not been noticed by, let alone incorporated into, the 
law. The second is to explore how three bodies of civil rights doctrine—
involving housing discrimination, vote dilution, and school segregation—are 
connected to racial groups’ housing patterns. My central claim is that all three 
bodies historically have relied on the existence of residential segregation, and 
that all three are unsettled by integration. Their role in a less racially separated 
America thus urgently needs to be rethought. 
This Article may come too late for some readers, and too soon for others. 
Too late because segregation has the ring of a bygone era, a time when the 
country paid more heed to, and worked harder to repair, its racial and spatial 
divisions.489 And too soon because our homes and schools, despite the progress 
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they have made, remain far from integrated. I would prefer to think, though, that 
the Article’s timing is quite apt. It is never overdue to call attention to where 
people choose to live or enroll their children. It also is hardly premature to reflect 
on the legal implications of desegregation. The trend is undeniable, it already is 
disrupting settled doctrine in several areas, and its impact only will grow in the 
future. The sooner the law begins to grapple with it, the better. 
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